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Abstract 
Social media, e-commerce, global peer-to-peer technologies, and the near ubiquity of computers 
and smartphones allow people to interact, trust, and exchange value across traditional socio-
economic control boundaries and over significant distances.  Since the creation in 2008 of a new 
cryptographic currency system called Bitcoin, a financial technology market sector of about 250 
billion USD has rapidly emerged, raising questions about the nature of currency in society and 
whether new types of non-national money are warranted and viable.  This debate has pitted 
heterodox economic interests against orthodox economic interests while it has rekindled interest 
in theories that view money as a social construct with a multitude of potential forms beyond ‘state’ 
or fiat money, and in forms that are increasingly predicted to be purely digital in the future.  This 
study seeks to explain the policy, social, and economic factors that underlie perceptions and usage 
of these new currency types.  First, I develop a novel theoretical matrix of trust and control to 
explain the conditions under which people choose to use any monetary system.  Then, I test this 
theory with a quantitative analysis of policy, trust, socio-economic, and cultural factors affecting 
the perceptions and usage of the new currency systems of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies in 28 
countries.  This analysis draws on usage metrics recorded from the Bitcoin and cryptocurrency 
network systems, attitudinal data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values 
Study (EVS), and a proprietary survey of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions and usage in 15 
countries conducted by Ipsos for the behavioral economics research department at ING Group.  I 
performed principal component analyses (PCA) to reduce factors among collected metrics, and I 
then integrated the findings of the PCA into a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
along three primary vectors: trust, control, and culture.  Based on my empirical findings, I group 
these new currency system users’ personality perspectives into four categories: Evangelists, 
Pragmatists, Skeptics, and Speculators.  The analysis finds Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions 
and usage are not correlated with the strictness or laxness of public policies concerning Bitcoin 
and cryptocurrencies.  The analysis also finds Bitcoin interest as measured by Google Search 
Trends is not correlated to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions and usage but is correlated to 
several lower socio-economic metrics related to crime and lack of confidence in law enforcement 
and government control.  There is more favorable perception and usage of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency in countries with less developed socio-economic profiles, and less favorable 
perceptions and usage in countries with more developed socio-economic profiles.  There is more 
favorable perception and usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency in countries with aggregate lower 
generalized trust and lower democratic tendencies, and less favorable perceptions and usage in 
countries with aggregate higher generalized trust and higher democratic tendencies.  Overall, the 
findings show the extent to which trends in usage and perception of the emergent currencies of 
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are associated with basic cultural and attitudinal tendencies that 
are not necessarily related to public policy or other typical monetary theory-based controls.  I 
conclude that a matrix of trust and control is effective at demonstrating how sociological factors 
explain the landscape of historical, extant, and emergent currency systems and this matrix predicts 
where Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies situate in society relative to these other currency systems. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Since the late 2008 declaration of a new non-state cryptographic currency system called 
Bitcoin, the last several years have witnessed the creation of an entirely new financial technology 
sector with over $500 billion in direct capitalization (Williams, 2017) and hundreds of billions in 
organizational investment from new financial companies – ‘fintech’ – and old financial 
companies alike (Bose, Price, & Bastid, 2018).1  Within this new financial sector, Bitcoin itself 
represents just 35% of the overall sector by market capitalization.  The other 65% of the market 
capitalization is from dozens of other major new non-state cryptographic currencies and 
hundreds of minor ones (Cornish, 2018).  Collectively, Bitcoin and non-Bitcoin cryptographic 
currencies are generally referred to as cryptocurrencies; a larger classification called digital 
currencies includes those non-state cryptocurrencies and also the traditional central bank and 
inter-bank currency systems that have begun to consider digital platforms.  As depicted in Figure 
1, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) developed a “money flower” Venn diagram that 
has been widely regarded as useful to disambiguate the overlapping terms used for various types 
of currency (Bech & Garratt, 2017).2 
 
1 Bitcoin (with a capital B) is the system which contains bitcoins (with a lower case b) 
2 For the purposes of this research, the phrase ‘Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies’ is frequently used to be clear about the 
breadth of the topic of inquiry and refers to non-state, non-central bank issued cryptographic currencies.  There are 
instances where only Bitcoin or only cryptocurrencies is referenced because there are distinctions within the 
research in some cases.  The phrase ‘digital currencies’ is used to refer to all types of currency, state, non-state, 
central bank, non-central bank, that have been or may be digitized from their physical form(s).  All digital currencies 
present questions about individual users’ perceptions and usage and regulatory control, Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
especially, and so it is important to distinguish them from traditional currencies otherwise in use today.  Great care 
has been taken to keep these terms consistent throughout this research. 
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Figure 1. BIS "Money Flower" Taxonomy of Money3 
 
Within the overall Bitcoin and cryptocurrency sector has blossomed a cottage industry of 
speculators, purveyors, enthusiasts, and detractors – and an increasingly familiar boutique of 
exotic financial products and derivatives.  Meanwhile, governments and financial interests 
around the world consider whether and how to react to the new realities of digital currencies.  
News reports regularly feature stories of hostage-taking in exchange for Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency, computer hijackings (ransomware) in exchange for Bitcoin and cryptocurrency, 
 
3 The BIS Venn diagram’s terms have evolved since its 2017 debut.  The sector’s evolving terminology and this 
research consider the grade-shaded areas as traditional central bank currencies (central bank digital currencies, or 
CBDCs, which, in 2017, were referred to as central bank cryptocurrencies, or CBCCs, but the stigma of crypto- has 
since been replace with the word digital by the central banks themselves), the cryptocurrency areas in the diagram 
are Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, and the overall green oval are all digital currencies.  Again, great care has been 
taken to keep these terms consistent throughout this research. 
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and speculators (including teenagers) making millions of dollars in mere months (Johnson, 2018; 
Chavez-Dreyfuss, 2018).  News organizations have taken to running regular news and features 
about the phenomena of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency, and there have arisen several new Bitcoin 
and cryptocurrency trade journals that cover the sector’s daily ups and downs, while numerous 
existing trade journals have shifted coverage to the possibilities of digital currency.  With recent 
instability in countries like Venezuela, some people have avoided the national currency’s 1.7M 
% annual inflation rate and converted their financial holding entirely into Bitcoin (Hernández, 
2019). 
The two basic properties of any currency are its ability to be a store of value (SoV) and 
medium of exchange (MoE).  With those two criteria in mind, while the general public may be 
dismissive of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies when they first hear of them, they have similarities to 
other long-standing non-national currencies like loyalty program “points” or frequent flyer 
“miles” from airline flights or airline-linked credit card use (Blanc, 2011).  Numerous other 
industries have rewards and “company credits” that can be considered currencies in basic senses 
of the word despite not being backed by a public institution, and these initiatives may expand 
greatly in the future: for example, recent polling indicates overwhelming public support for an 
Amazon “store credit” in the form of a cryptocurrency (Rooney, 2018a).  Rare comic books, rare 
baseball cards, Chuck E. Cheese tokens, and even collectible money – which can have a market 
value many times greater than its face-value – are other examples of non-national, alternative 
currency systems that the public exchanges or on which it speculates because of the expectation 
that these objects will hold or increase their value.  In the last few decades, numerous regionally-
based complementary currency systems have also emerged around the world.  These systems 
link many kinds of community contributions (e.g., loyalty, gifting, volunteering, community 
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building) to an exchangeable unit of value often represented by a physical token or piece of 
paper (Seyfang & Longhurst, 2018). 
The new distributed ledger, or blockchain, technologies that cryptocurrencies exploit 
arguably could make these complementary currency systems more viable, offering the scalability 
and accessibility of the internet coupled with the internet’s ability to connect individuals across 
geographic and cultural boundaries – two powerful features that past technological innovations, 
such as email for communication and web browsing for information retrieval, have exploited to 
transform other areas of social and economic life.  For example, while a regionally-focused (or 
any geographic community) complementary currency can still be met by non-digital systems, the 
introduction of cryptocurrencies means that supra-regional networks can more easily emerge to 
address the needs of a particular industry or social group.  Non-Bitcoin cryptocurrencies like 
DentaCoin for the dental supply chain, KodakCoin for digital media copyrights, and HempCoin 
for marijuana merchants could function as a unit of account and medium of exchange for their 
specific industries and are examples of the new wave of socio-economic networks that can be 
connected by and trade value via cryptocurrency systems. 
Before the advent of cryptocurrency technologies, complementary currencies were 
limited by their need for in-person exchanges.  Furthermore, they used closed, proprietary 
platforms, often using paper or other physical mediums.  Cryptocurrencies, however, face neither 
of these limitations.  As such, they have gained more traction, more quickly, than those 
antecedent systems, and are rapidly being touted even as possible replacements for national 
currencies, with Bitcoin and larger cryptocurrencies like Ethereum (billed as a smart-contract 
currency system), Dash (billed as digital cash), and Litecoin (a Bitcoin variant) intended to 
appeal to buyers and merchants around the world in need of an apolitical and/or non-state store 
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of value and/or medium of exchange.  Other emergent systems like Zcash and Monero are 
specifically privacy-focused cryptocurrencies with complex randomization and anonymization 
features to completely obscure transactions and the identities of those who hold the currency.  
Because of the peer-to-peer aspect of cryptocurrencies and their distributed ledgers, users are 
transacting with each other at little cost, and are doing so directly – not through an intermediate 
private or central bank, or state system. 
The rapid emergence of cryptocurrencies has obliged numerous governments and other 
public and private organizations to respond in a variety of ways (Rooney, 2018b).  Some have 
imposed, or begun regulatory and legislative processes to impose, policies affecting 
cryptocurrency transactions, among them: 
1. levying taxes on trading profits from cryptocurrencies 
2. considering money laundering vectors and settling theft claims involving 
cryptocurrency’s use 
3. permitting cryptocurrency use for political campaign finance or tax remittance 
4. banning the usage of cryptocurrencies, and 
5. contemplating public-sanctioned versions of cryptocurrency to complement or 
supplant their own traditional currency systems (McKenna, 2017) with replacements 
to traditional currency systems by all-digital currencies 
A concerted policy response by any particular government has been made more difficult 
because often multiple departments of the same government, which each regulate a different 
aspect of money, disagree about the nature of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency – whether they are an 
asset, security, currency, investment, novelty, or nothing at all.  The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission uses the “Howey Test” to determine whether a purchase or sale is an 
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investment contract, but that is not a simple determination for cryptocurrencies, and the rest of 
the world has not refined their regulations even to that point.4 
Some governments, like China and India, have expressed outright hostility toward 
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.  In the U.S. and other wealthy countries, policymakers have 
tended to take a more cautious stance, with the goal of letting the nascent technology grow for 
the users.  Regulations tend to be light, a matter of preventing outright fraud and abuse of the 
systems.  A third group of countries are pursuing strategies to tap potential economic 
development opportunities arising from Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies: everything from being 
“crypto friendly” by holding off on any regulation, like Switzerland is currently doing, to 
actively considering a national digital currency, as Malta and the tiny Marshall Islands are doing 
(Bloomberg Crypto Ed., 2018).  For countries facing economic sanctions, Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies may also have geopolitical benefits.  Venezuela is contemplating a petro-
backed national cryptocurrency, while Iran and North Korea are considering whether they, too, 
can skirt international sanctions on traditional fiat currency instruments by running their own 
national cryptocurrency (Thoms, 2018) or hoarding Bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies. 
At the same time, the spread of cryptocurrencies has fueled anxiety within the financial 
sector.  In their 2018 annual reports, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, and Goldman Sachs all 
specifically cited digital currencies generally as a threat to their businesses due to the risk that 
cryptocurrencies may one day supplant traditional financial system functions or that pure digital 
currencies would render obsolete much of the banks’ physical infrastructure (Hochstein, 2018).  
Major U.S. and U.K. financial institutions have also flagged digital currencies as a threat to 
 
4 The Howey Test is based on an 80-year-old U.S. Supreme Court case about landlords, rents, contract law, and 
investment via postal mail and under the auspices of U.S. interstate commerce regulation of a citrus grove in Florida 
– hardly an effective benchmark for Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies with global reach. 
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Automated Teller Machines (ATM) deployments, given that cryptocurrencies have no need for 
cash (De, 2018).  In response to these sorts of concerns, Bank of America, Capital One, J.P. 
Morgan, and Lloyd’s Banking Group have banned the use of credit cards for buying 
cryptocurrencies, arguing that they need to support anti-money laundering protections and also 
protect themselves and their customers from buying something that might rapidly decline in 
value or cease to exist completely (Harrow, 2018).  Nevertheless, these market interventions may 
also be aimed at stunting the growth of competitive digital currency systems that could obviate 
these banks’ existence. 
These developments raise several questions.  First, to what extent does governmental 
regulation of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency use matter in terms of consumers’ perceptions and 
behavior and overall market activity?  Second, if the demand for Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
are driven by latent societal factors, what are they?  In the case of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency, 
little belief or faith in democratic institutions or weak socio-economic development in certain 
countries could provoke their citizens to use them out of a desire to find a reliable medium of 
exchange.  In contrast, countries with highly developed democratic institutions and stable or 
growing economies could have many citizens who are interested in Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
because they want to invest in promising speculative instruments.  Understanding the specific 
factors that drive consumer demand for cryptocurrencies can make policies to regulate them 
more effective, enforceable, and likely to promote the public good. 
To these ends, this study examined how country-specific public policy and social factors 
are related to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions and usage.  It developed an original and 
rigorous approach toward measuring Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions and usage and to 
assessing public policies related to cryptocurrencies.  Given that Bitcoin – by far the largest 
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cryptocurrency – and other cryptocurrencies are radically new types of currency system often 
explicitly intended to be decentralized and difficult to trace (as further explicated below), 
research to construct such measures can by itself contribute significantly to our understanding of 
all digital currency systems perceptions and usage.  Do individuals want decentralized and 
difficult-to-trace currency or just easier ways to execute transactions? 
This study also put forward a new theoretical typology by which to categorize different 
types of socio-economic value and exchange, one that accounts for the unique characteristics of 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies while also putting them in the context of a wide range of previously 
developed currencies (e.g., fiat, specie, non-state, and hawala).  From this theory, I made claims 
about the specific conditions under which we might expect each type of currency to proliferate.  I 
then used data relating to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions and usage to test these claims. 
Some broad questions about the digital currency phenomena, which this proposal 
clarified, are: 
1. What constitutes cryptocurrency perceptions and usage and how can these be 
measured? 
2. What public policies are related to cryptocurrency perceptions and usage and how can 
this association be measured? 
3. What societal factors are related to cryptocurrency perceptions and usage and how 
can this association be measured? 
The ultimate goal of this theoretical and empirical investigation was to further our 
understanding of the social nature of currency and the ways that cryptocurrency might serve to 
complement or even supplant traditional central bank currencies and related aspects of 
government and the state.  Given their rapid growth, Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies appear to be 
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filling some sort of need within society and markets – but there is little research explaining why 
and where this is happening.  Understanding Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies’ use is vital to public 
policy debates as governments grapple with new questions about the nature of money in society 
and the role of policy responses to new technologies, as well as how traditional central bank and 
inter-bank systems can be successfully digitized. 
Literature Review 
Theories of money, currency, and socio-economic value and exchange 
One of the things Bitcoin unwittingly unleashed in 2008 was a rekindled debate over the 
nature of currency that had been simmering for many years as globalization increased.  William 
Stanley Jevons (1875) is often credited with explicating the first forthright, modern description 
of money.  Money, he argued, served four basic purposes: a medium of exchange (currency); a 
common measure of value (commonly accepted); a standard of value (ability to convey as credit 
or debt), and a store of value (long-term savings).5  Jevons’s writing on this topic fell in line with 
the dominant perspective that had prevailed among Enlightenment political economists, who had 
seen money solely in terms of merchant’s utility – metaphorically, Adam Smith’s “self-interest” 
aggregating as an “invisible hand” where “all money was assumed to be capital” (Graeber, 
2011).  At that time, currency was considered a universal equivalent of economic values.  Even 
as capitalist systems expanded greatly over the next century, later theorists would not stray far 
from this narrow understanding of the nature of money.6 
 
5 However, more recent theories about money and currency put the number of properties at eight: intrinsic value, 
face value, incentive value, payment mechanism, trust proxy, cultural assertion, unit of value, and interest-bearing 
value (Visser & McIntosh, 1998) 
6 Karl Marx (1959), for instance, considered money “the object of eminent possession,” the ultimate manifestation 
of property. 
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Sociology in the late 19th century began to superimpose on the “market money” of Smith 
and Jevons the idea that money was a social construct and not merely a mechanical lubricant for 
economic pursuits that had supplanted barter, and novel sociological theories looked deeper into 
society than the then-present day economy.  The semioticians Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles 
Peirce saw money as a construct of understanding, one limited by the extent to which the 
common understanding was mutual; in other words, the symbolic nature of currency inherently 
imposed a centralized form of control on its usage, given to these socially accepted 
understandings of its value (Dyer, 1989).  These early theories led to more specific 
considerations of the social nature of money as a linguistic and symbolic carrier of social bonds.  
Georg Simmel (2011) in the early 1900s described currency as a “claim upon society” – an 
implicit contract between the user and society.  Sally Frankel (1976) argued that money 
embodied the perpetual conflict between the individual and the centralized control inherent in 
modern economies. Mid- to late-20th-century economists like John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich 
Hayek, and Milton Friedman tried to square – from different ends of the political spectrum – 
conflicting notions of money as the universal equivalent and an evolved social glue enabling 
economic stability and freedom. 
At the start of the 21st century, David Graeber (2001) argued for an “anthropological 
theory of value,” which effectively demotes money to merely one kind of social value, with 
others being concepts like trust, love, and sense of community.  He later extended this theory by 
focusing on what he called a more fundamental aspect of value: debt.  His seminal 2011 review 
of the 5,000-year history of debt made the case that debt has always been the main and most 
important attribute of money, regardless of money’s function, but here Graeber also underscored 
the fact that societies understood “debt” to be not just a monetary obligation, but also a social 
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one.  Indeed, Graeber’s history notably described how the ancient civilization of Yap exchanged 
thousand-pound stones between cooperating villages, in one of the earliest documented examples 
of currency.  These stones were signs of indebtedness between villages and within early tribal 
relationships in what was essentially a gift economy.  More popular among early civilizations, of 
course, were relatively more modern notions of currency: cowrie shells and rare-earth substances 
like gold, copper, iron, and gemstones.  The defining characteristic of these varied forms of 
money was the way they exchanged indebtedness among their users.  These exchanges were 
closely tied to – but did not supplant – barter trade.  Such currency-related trade continued for 
thousands of years, with gold and silver eventually becoming the dominant forms of currency in 
Western societies. 
Recognizing the social nature of money rather than just the economic nature of money 
challenges the conventional view that centralized currency is a natural outgrowth of ever more 
complex and transactional socio-economic activity.  It also allows social scientists to focus on 
the increasingly important role money has played in modern societies as a tool of sovereign 
nations to meet the needs of national public policy and political goals, with currencies directly, 
and some ways indirectly, imposed upon the public.  In the United States, for example, 
Alexander Hamilton – who argued in favor of a strong national government in various other 
policy and administrative areas – also advocated for central banking because of the political 
power it would consolidate, recognizing how the Bank of England had helped centralize power 
in the United Kingdom centuries earlier.  Hamilton posthumously is credited with the idea for the 
U.S. Federal Reserve system, which was fully developed in the early 20th century.  However, of 
the last 2,500 years of centralized currency systems and 200 years of “ardent study” of them 
have come monetary systems that are not satisfactory (Galbraith, 1975).  Highly refined central 
 12 
bank currencies continue to draw criticism about their failures to manage the tension between 
inflation and employment and pernicious market bubbles and recessions.7  They are also 
criticized for not fully accounting for all of society’s costs from market externalities like 
pollution or global pandemics to social exigencies like prison population management or slowing 
population growth – which are significant aspects of society and the economy that even 
proponents of centralized currencies cannot square with the typical econometrics they use.8  
More recently, a growing body of research attempts to account for the failure of prevailing 
currency systems to account for emotional labor and relational work, the glue that underpins 
dominant economic narratives (Zelizer, 1989). 
Bitcoin, cryptocurrency, and digital currency 
A view of money as a social construct and not just an economic lubricant also inevitably 
raises questions about whether forms of currency other than state-sanctioned money could 
complement or replace central bank currencies.  Skepticism of, and resistance to, the primacy of 
central bank-regulated state currencies peaked during the global financial crisis of 2008.  As 
global markets crashed that year, an anonymous actor or group of actors (henceforth referred to 
by last name or in the third-person plural) going by the name Satoshi Nakamoto (2009) finalized 
and published a specification for Bitcoin, a digital currency system based on computer 
 
7 Recent analysis indicates “between 1970 and 2007 there were 124 systemic banking crises, 208 currency crises, 63 
episodes of sovereign debt defaults while between 1670 and 1970 there were 48 major crashes [monetary and/or 
currency related]" (Lietaer, et al., 2012). 
8 The concerns that national currency systems might not be serving society holistically have even arisen among 
financial elites.  In 2018, Leonard Fink, the CEO of BlackRock – the largest investment fund in the world, with 
USD 6 trillion in holdings – indicated corporations seeking investments from BlackRock would need to demonstrate 
their social value and not just their profitability (George, 2018).  This demonstrates the growing sense of concern 
about the purely economic utility of modern currency systems.  While there have been centuries of central banking 
and decades of highly technocratic monetary policy post-WWII – the Bretton Woods system – the largest 
investment firm in the world is now specifically seeking social value in addition to profitability to win its 
investment. 
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cryptography.  According to Nakamoto, one of the purported strengths of the Bitcoin currency 
system was that it was computed to have a fixed supply of currency (21M bitcoins) that would 
keep inflation and business cycles in check as opposed to central bank systems that could print 
unlimited amounts of currency, which Nakamoto believed leads to inflation and business cycle 
bubbles.  Over the next several years, this technological novelty of cryptographic currency 
inspired thousands of variants and great public interest – with “bitcoin” becoming the third most 
searched Google term in 2017.  Prior to 2008, there had been various ideas bandied about for 
denationalized currencies – among them, Friedrich von Hayek’s (1990) treatise on 
denationalized currency, electronic cash in the mid-1980s (Moore, 2013), e-gold in 1996 by 
Douglas Jackson (2007), “bit gold” as a digital coin in 1998 (Szabo, 2008),  and even a 
prediction by Milton Friedman in 1999 that internet e-cash would one day emerge (Cawrey, 
2014).9  However, no serious efforts had been made to launch any of these ideas on a global 
scale.  Nakamoto’s surprise release of a scant eight-page technical specification for Bitcoin not 
only introduced a fully formed and practical system for value exchange entirely by computer 
system but also provided a concise political manifesto on behalf of its widespread use.  
Nakamoto’s stated motivation was the global financial crisis, which they believed was directly 
caused by the political nature of monetary systems in the U.S. and other major nations. 
Their solution was relatively simple: Bitcoin would be comprised of discrete units 
(bitcoins or decimal fractions thereof) on an electronic ledger, distributed among any participant 
in the system by using cryptography similar to modern secure internet transactions.  This 
 
9 Szabo is seen by industry experts as possibly the real Satoshi Nakamoto (Popper, 2015) or part of the group behind 
Satoshi Nakamoto.  Szabo has been at the forefront of the digital currency debate and discussion for decades and 
especially since the publication of the bitcoin whitepaper.  He is something of a polymath and has been a central 
character in various forums about computer cryptography, currency systems, and other information systems, as well 
as a variety of social science topics. 
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distributed ledger (called a blockchain) records a chain of activities in an immutable – if pseudo-
anonymous – form.10  The public ledger is maintained by computer network nodes that process 
transactions to earn coins and compute cryptographic algorithms to mine new coins to be used in 
the network.  Nakamoto’s design with this method of node interaction was to mimic the mining 
of gold or other rare-earth physical currency types. 
With the growth of Bitcoin in the years after 2008, numerous other cryptocurrencies 
emerged that relied on the same type of distributed ledger technology and included interesting 
new features like executable code (in the case of the cryptocurrency Ethereum) and pure random 
number generation and proxied transmission to make its use truly anonymous (in the case of 
Zcash and Monero).  One notable class of cryptocurrencies that has emerged is Distributed 
Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), where the transactions and behavior of the cryptocurrency 
are intended at the outset as a digital commons for the creation and execution of software code – 
known as “contracts” – that are proposed and voted on by holders of the currency, which can 
take on a life of their own, beyond those who started them.  These DAOs, like all distributed 
ledger currency systems, rely on the consensus of all participating nodes to settle the transactions 
and for future changes to the network, which could include even a decision to cease to exist, if 
that were the consensus of the holders (like DigixDAO recently did). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has generated a widely regarded illustration of 
virtual currencies that is helpful to clarify the overlapping terms in the cryptocurrency field (He, 
et al., 2016).  Figure 2 illustrates various types of cryptocurrencies and how they relate to digital 
currency. 
 
10 This distributed ledger has gained a life of its own as a significant new technology for improving business and 
administrative processes.  It was based on patented technology processes by W. Scott Stornetta and Stuart Haber 
(Stornetta & Haber, 1991). 
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Figure 2. IMF Taxonomy of Virtual Currencies 
 
One of the most critical parts of the infrastructure for all these cryptocurrencies is the 
ability to buy and sell the units (coins or multi-decimal fractions thereof) from other users.  To 
this end, dozens of major exchanges and hundreds of minor ones have sprouted up around the 
world.  The initial purchases on an exchange are usually made with fiat national currencies 
through a computer browser or with a smartphone, usually by buying bitcoin or one of the other 
main cryptocurrencies (e.g., Ethereum, Ripple, or a USD-backed stablecoin); then exchanges and 
trades can be made into any other cryptocurrency.11  Once the purchase is cleared, the coins 
function just like cash and stocks in a stock exchange.  Coins can be transferred among 
supporting exchanges or to a user’s digital wallet, which effectively takes the coin out of third-
party control and gives the user direct custody of the coin, whereby it can be spent at merchants 
that accept that type of coin in exchange for goods or services.  Using this system, users can 
 
11 There are two main exchanges that function like Craigslist.com for cryptocurrencies, localbitcoin.com and Paxful.  
These link buyers and sellers in a marketplace and the exchanges can and do often take place offline. 
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securely transmit large amounts of cryptocurrency around the world and with complete 
confidence in the transfer, based on the consensus of the network nodes.12  The exchange process 
may take anywhere from a few seconds to a few minutes, and cost merely small decimal 
fractions of the currency (regardless of the size of the transaction itself) paid to the nodes that 
confirm the transaction to achieve an authoritative settlement.  By contrast, in the traditional 
currency world, wire transfers take a minimum of 18 to 24 hours and typically have high fees 
associated with them; for retail purchases using credit or debit cards in fiat currency, the third-
party vendors typically charge the merchant a fee of 2% to 5% of the transaction total.  A 
cryptocurrency transaction typically costs a few cents (USD) to a few dollars for any size 
transaction. 
Within the cryptocurrency sector, investment and speculation (and a burgeoning catalog 
of familiar-sounding exotic derivatives and former Wall Street denizens) have grown in response 
to the popularity of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.  A recent trend for investment or raising 
capital is the implementation of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), which represent a company 
offering of cryptocurrency, much like a stock market Initial Public Offering (IPO), with the 
stated intention of using the cryptocurrency for other socio-economic goods and services once it 
is fully in production.13  Recently the Chicago Mercantile Exchange started offering futures 
contracts relating to Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, other traditional stock exchanges report 
 
12 The consensus process by which distributed ledgers running cryptocurrencies work is itself a technological 
innovation and breakthrough application in information systems and science research, but an extended discussion of 
it is beyond the scope of the present research. 
13 An obvious question that often arises in this sector is: if cryptocurrencies are superior to fiat, why do ICOs want to 
exchange their new cryptocurrency for fiat?  The answers to this question vary based on the legitimacy of the agents 
behind the ICO. 
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cryptocurrency indices, and many cryptocurrency exchanges offer margin trading to provide 
speculators and investors the ability to short-sell cryptocurrencies. 
Meanwhile, cryptocurrencies designed as tokens (like Verge or MakerDAO) are being 
developed to complement an entire marketplace of goods and services, which can be exchanged 
for no cost within the system for transactions using the tokens.  These token systems are very 
much like loyalty points systems for credit card usage or airline travel or the Amazon “store 
credit” discussed above.  Recently, Facebook announced an intention to lead a large group of 
private-sector organizations in the creation of a “basket” currency call Libra that would be a 
stable medium of exchange for online sales and market activities.  This has been met with 
significant skepticism from regulators in the U.S. and other countries and its future, at least as 
initially envisioned, is in doubt.  But Libra’s slow start foreshadows more efforts in the future 
from industry and even smaller countries to take advantage of new technologies to attain new 
relevance in the modern economy. 
With such network systems rapidly developing, there have been numerous reports of 
thefts and technical glitches that cost users time and money (of various types).  These incidents 
are not unique to cryptocurrencies, and supporters of cryptocurrencies compare them to 
happenings in the traditional currency world, for instance, when someone’s purse or wallet is 
stolen, a bank error occurs, an armed robbery of a bank takes place, or a corporation defrauds 
customers of their assets.14  What has not occurred in the first decade since the launch of 
cryptocurrencies, however, is any known instance in which the cryptography or the code of these 
currency systems was compromised by direct assault, destroying the cryptocurrency network or 
preventing it from running.  Despite significant efforts by hackers to thwart its system, for 
 
14 Some of the ICOs as hinted about in footnote 13 above meet this definition of traditional corporate fraud. 
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instance, Bitcoin since inception has worked continuously with zero downtime and no central 
authority maintaining it.  While there have been exploitations of human error in some of the 
cryptocurrencies, these were not “hacks” in the sense of malicious activity creating a 
vulnerability, they were just examples of poorly written code.15 
So far, any inquiry into why people are turning to or avoiding Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies has largely been limited to gossip in trade journals and the Twittersphere’s 
superficial speculation about political perspectives advocated by Bitcoin proponents – known as 
Bitcoin “maximalists” in the vernacular of the cryptocurrency world – that tend toward the 
libertarian or even social anarchist.  Yet the need to understand public attitudes and behaviors 
regarding cryptocurrencies continues to grow because cryptocurrencies are a proxy for larger 
governmental efforts to digitize traditional currency systems.  Users’ perception of non-state 
cryptocurrency may or may not be similar to their perceptions of state-backed digital currencies.  
Such information is also particularly useful to central banks and governments, for instance, who 
have found that regulating Bitcoin and cryptocurrency effectively can be challenging.  First, 
cryptocurrency systems are completely encrypted and inherently decentralized, making them 
very opaque to regulators even with extreme traditional investigation powers.  Furthermore, they 
are entirely internet-based.  Blocking them would essentially require blocking the internet, an 
untenable regulatory approach in most countries.  Besides, when consumer demand is significant 
enough, people often find a way to enjoy a banned product and risk the consequences.  Once 
 
15 These coding issues have resulted in new possibilities for the sector as ideological differences among the 
participants in a cryptocurrency network have caused them to react differently to code exploitations.  Some 
participants remain in the same network after the exploitation, regardless of the results of the exploit, while others 
may decide to split (“fork”) the network and take different actions in the network relative to the exploit.  This is 
similar to other open source software movements over the decades. 
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enough people are flouting a law – as happened with the U.S. prohibition of alcohol in the early 
1900s – injunctions become less effective and punishments harder to administer. 
Indeed, the growing use of cryptocurrencies raises questions about whether they could 
proliferate more quickly than previous alternative currencies have been able.  In the Internet era, 
the rapid adoption of technologies has frequently outstripped the ability of regulators or affected 
industries to control them, at least at first.  For example, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) had to resort to lawsuits to stamp out music downloads, reaping negative 
publicity for suing deceased grandmothers and 30,000 other “John/Jane Does” (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 2008).  Other examples of rapid adoptions and disruptions despite private- 
or public-sector efforts to curtail them abound: eBay and Craigslist supplanting classified ads 
and newspaper revenue; online retailers and consumers avoiding sales taxes; self-publishing via 
blogs or social media circumventing efforts by established media companies to reduce the use of 
their content; and ride- and residence-sharing (via companies like Uber or Airbnb) that exploit 
regulatory and economic inefficiencies in those markets. 
Eventually, governments and industries are often able to use these technologies for their 
own benefit in important ways, even if they can attempt to block them, but these incumbents’ 
after-the-fact policymaking is actually dictated by the early adopters’ motivations.  Thus, it is 
important to discover them as soon as possible.  For instance, after the music industry updated its 
distribution models, customers embraced the purchasing of music online; online retailers pay 
sales taxes now; Uber and Airbnb have become subject to taxes and have taken some steps to 
self-regulate in response to public pressure.  Nevertheless, in all these cases, the new 
technologies could not be entirely stopped by government or industry policy due to strong 
consumer demand to use them.  Given how similar peer-to-peer technologies have disrupted 
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established interests, could currency systems be subject to the same technologically driven, mass 
adoption forces seeking non-state cryptocurrency systems? 
This research answered this question by measuring the adoption of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency systems and assessing what factors might explain trends in their perceptions and 
usage.  To be sure, the effort to do so is a challenge because measures of the two main properties 
of any currency – being a store of value and medium of exchange – are just beginning to be 
developed for Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies.  Nevertheless, it is revealing that the financial 
industry itself is acting with the expectation that Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies will continue to 
grow, by trying to restrain them or out-pace them.  Additionally, entrenched financial companies 
are beginning to adopt cryptocurrency technologies for their internal systems and customer 
offerings to compete with “fintech startups” that are building a customer base with native 
cryptocurrency technologies.  Also, a growing list of central banks and inter-bank NGOs around 
the world are evaluating their ability to convert to digital currency system(s) of their own or of 
mutual creation for a range of financial transaction purposes. 
Theories to explain currency creation, adoption, and usage 
There has been limited research on currency use and adoption at the individual user level.  
An oft-repeated maxim in the macroeconomic world is that bad money replaces good money, 
known as “Gresham’s Law,” which assesses macro-level individual currency use.  The theory is 
that new political-economic forces debase commodity currencies, causing users to hoard higher 
value (good) money and exchange or use lower value (debased or bad) money, which, 
eventually, takes the good money out of circulation, as well as central-bank coffers (Galbraith, 
1975; Selgin, 2019), and there are numerous historical examples of this.  However, it is 
contradictory to theorize that the more valuable something is the less it is used, thus driving up 
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scarcity, because why would a currency that can increase in value get used?16  As for non-
national, community currencies, Pfajfar, et al. (2012) attempted to predict public interest in local 
community complementary currency systems (of the time-bank and economic development 
variety, discussed below) across 76 countries, using a series of fundamental economic indicators 
as explanatory variables. 
They hypothesized that complementary currencies were either substitutes for fiat or 
complementary to fiat and thus focused on currency systems’ existence as a proxy for the 
underlying effects of the currency system’s use.  Their results indicated a positive correlation of 
the number of complementary currency systems in a country to the country’s overall monetary 
stability and economic development.  Their research was an interesting first step at identifying 
transnational indicators of currency system viability; however, the dependent variable they chose 
was not rigorous (existence of complementary currencies systems as voluntarily reported to an 
ad hoc field database) and did not look at specific aspects of the users of the potential alternative 
currency systems.  For example, assessing the societal attitudes and perspectives of the 
individuals who have chosen to use the currency as a dependent variable could be much more 
valuable to understanding the viability than whether a system exists. 
Recent studies of the creation and adoption of fiat currencies have focused on the euro 
(EUR), a currency system that now spans multiple nations and cultures, mostly in Western 
Europe.  The euro was researched and planned as a new central currency system using the 
Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory.  OCA considers the transaction costs within an economic 
 
16 This is a growing paradox among holders of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency (HODLers as they are called because an 
errant typographic error some years ago misspelled HOLD and created the acronym of Hold on for Dear Life as the 
price of Bitcoin experienced volatility, Gresham’s Law in reverse) who realize if they spend it to increase usage and 
adoption they may miss increases in its value as a scarce resource currency. 
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area to determine how far a single currency should extend based on the efficient and optimal 
allocation of macroeconomic metrics (Ricci, 1997).  Using macroeconomic indicators and 
monetary theory-based controls like inflationary biases, economic shock disparities, and relative 
firm labor mobility, central banks attempt to forecast the blending or “currency substitution” of 
an existing currency in favor of a foreign currency that may or may not benefit the users of the 
currency more than the operators of the currency (i.e., central banks and the private banks they 
support). 
However, OCA is limited in that its approach is strictly macroeconomic and well-
removed from the ground level of considering what the public wants or would accept.  Not 
surprisingly, the debate over the euro’s legitimacy, while seemingly settled at the OCA level, 
still rages at the political level (European Commission, 2018b).  Political and economic 
upheavals – particularly, Greece’s tumultuous fiscal issues and the United Kingdom’s prolonged 
exit from the EU – have shaken faith in the euro in many European countries (Müller, Porcaro, & 
von Nordheim, 2018).  Occasions when state money “breaks down” – such as recent 
demonetization events in India, Venezuela, and Sweden – raise similar questions within the 
public sphere about the need to rely on fiat currencies at all.  OCA does not account for these 
possibilities because it explains the dissemination of a new currency based on macroeconomic 
factors, not according to what might be ideal for microeconomic or sub-national social needs – 
simply put, what individuals think is a good value. 
A similar comparative analysis of multiple currency systems was done by Aschheim and 
Park (1976) in their review of post-Bretton Woods emergent currency systems.  They defined a 
generic typology of the Artificial Currency Unit (ACU) that would proliferate in a post-gold 
standard global economy because currencies had actually become decoupled from any 
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universality.  Currencies would devolve from merely in-country variants of a universal standard 
(typically gold) to become distinctive political constructs in each country.  Where gold had been 
the standard and national currencies were mathematical proxies for it, without the backing of 
gold for global currencies, each currency became its own in-country socio-economic measure, 
self-defined by that country, and recent evidence suggests they have bordered on the 
experimental, with countries like Venezuela, Argentina, and Greece experiencing significant 
monetary policy challenges.  Thus, national currencies were now merely political creatures that 
took on a life of their own, ergo, artificial currencies.  Aschheim and Park’s ACU theory is an 
interesting socio-economic by-product of moving off the gold standard and gives significant 
legitimacy to arguments that currencies are social constructs – that can vary from country to 
country – and not merely universal equivalents. 
Meanwhile, the emergence of cryptocurrencies has presented the public with a new 
generation of alternative currencies from which to potentially choose.  These currencies do not 
necessarily need to supplant existing fiat money for their usage to become widespread, in many 
ways an ACU but available globally, and their coexistence with all existing types of currencies 
brings new challenges for how to reconcile the field.  The work of Cohen (2015) is useful here to 
understand the ways that multiple currencies can be used concurrently.  As illustrated in Figure 
3, Cohen proposes a currency pyramid of world currency systems.  He categorizes various 
currencies based on how widespread an appeal they have, ultimately ranking them from top to 
bottom in this way: the U.S. dollar is the top currency; below that are cross-border “patrician” 
currencies like the euro and yen; then “elite” currencies like British pound and Swiss franc; 
“plebian currencies” are only used domestically; and “permeate” and “quasi” currencies are 
systems that have widespread use within lower socio-economic strata countries disproportionate 
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to the overall strength of the system; they are organically and reflexively used because there is no 
alternative for those populations. 
Where a country’s currency type is located in the pyramid is based on its “economic size, 
financial development, foreign policy ties, and military reach – together with market range and 
inertia” (Subacchi, 2016).  These aspects of Cohen’s currency pyramid are well aligned to be 
collected and compared with trends in Bitcoin and cryptocurrency use.  As discussed below, 
variables integrated from these theories include a country’s population demographics, socio-
economic development, democratic institutional strength, and geographic identifiers.  One of 
Cohen’s primary findings is that lower levels of currency are actually viable and preferred by the 
public of certain countries, while those same citizens may transact in higher-level currencies for 
narrow forms of economic activity.  For instance, some permeated currencies are used as an 
everyday medium of exchange and no one saves them (keeps their savings in them), while upper-
Top Currency 
U.S. Dollar 
Patrician Currency 
Euro and Yen Currency 
(U.S. Dollar) 
Elite Currency 
UK Pound, CH Franc, AU Dollar 
Plebian Currency 
Norway, Sweden, So. Korean, Taiwan, Kuwait, S Arabia 
Permeated Currency 
Latin Am., former Soviet bloc, Southeast Asia 
Quasi-Currency 
Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Peru, Cambodia, Laos 
Pseudo-Currency 
Panamanian balboa 
Figure 3. Cohen's Currency Pyramid 
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level currency types may be used as a medium of exchange but are also used as a functional store 
of value because they are considered to be bankable (users also keep their long-term savings in 
these currencies); the Chinese yuan and renminbi are examples of this.  While these currencies 
are all state fiat currencies, their widespread use and coexistence within particular countries 
reinforce the complexities of currency systems and challenge the perspectives of currency 
theories like OCA, which imply that the adoption of a single “universal equivalent” is essentially 
inevitable.  While conventional monetary and currency studies consider central bank and inter-
bank currencies as evolved “universal equivalents” and interstitial lubricants across different 
national settings, there are a growing number of non-national currencies – and many that have 
never gone away – that users can and do choose for a variety of socio-economic needs.  This 
includes the object of this research, Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, that are neither explained nor 
predicted by those traditional theories. 
An alternative theory: trust and control 
A deeper inquiry into how we perceive and why we use currency systems requires us to 
involve and take seriously the role of trust because it is a significant aspect of any socio-
economic interaction, and notably missing from macro-economic monetary theory.  Trust has 
two components, the trusted entity – which has varying amounts of trustworthiness – and the 
trust extended by another party in a relationship with that trusted entity.  Trust is a cornerstone of 
currency systems and a complex interplay between the users of the system and any given user’s 
perception of the system itself – a system that could represent at least the two main functions of 
money (a medium of exchange and a store of value), if not many more. 
Of particular utility for examining currency systems and trust are behavioral scientific 
approaches involving game theory and bounded rationality, which have challenged the rational-
 26 
actor models of economic behavior that are the explicit or implicit basis for theories of currency 
systems as a universal equivalent.  These rational-actor models presume individuals can know all 
possible inputs and outputs of economic transactions and act in an objective manner based on 
that understanding.  In behavioral science, notions of trust and risk are captured in the “trust 
game,” which covers a range of anthropologic trust scenarios (Gintis, 2009).  Participants are 
given a small sum of money to exchange with other participants through mutual judgments of 
altruism and personal gain (Berg, et al., 1995).  This mirrors economic value exchange from 
prehistoric barter to contemporary social entrepreneurship endeavors – much like the landscape 
of extant of modern currency systems.  What becomes clear in these trust games is that actors 
cannot know all rational inputs and outputs and instead use personal judgments, privileging the 
factors they do know, which have eroded the main thrust of “rational agent” economic models.  
From these studies and similar research, scholars have developed theories of bounded rationality 
that, I argue, challenge orthodox universal-equivalent views of currencies.  Because no one actor 
(or monetary theorist or political economist) can know all economic factors at work in a 
transaction, neither can a national currency (nor certainly multiple national currencies) account 
for individual economic value prioritization.  In other words, a universal-equivalent theory of 
money cannot account for the complexities of trust as it operates in the real world to determine 
individual attitudes and behaviors relating to currency use.  If bounded rationality is accurate and 
true then the universal equivalent theory of currency cannot successfully describe currency 
systems or underpin monetary theory and political economics. 
Other research in behavioral science underscores the role that trust plays in making 
money “work.”  As Francis Fukuyama (1995) suggests, the levels of generalized trust that 
individuals have in people outside of one’s family can predict how economically successful a 
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society may become.  He asserts a level of “social capital” accrues in high-trust societies that 
explains their citizens’ overall economic prosperity while low-trust societies need relatively 
more governmental intervention – control – to mitigate deficiencies in non-familial trust 
relationships.  Daniel Kahneman (2002) posits individuals make decisions based on either 
intuition or deliberation – what he terms “System 1” and “System 2” thinking.  Kahneman uses 
the image below (the left-hand portion of Figure 3) to illustrate these two approaches. 
On the left side of Figure 3, the center symbol in each row can represent either the letter 
B or the number 13 depending on the intuitive context or rules of its placement, which shows 
how human cognition can use the exact same symbol for different intuited or deliberated 
conclusions.  If each of those center symbols stood alone, the viewer would take an intuitive 
approach to determine its meaning and trust their intuition.  However, in a context of other 
information (the additional inscriptions on either side, the “A”/“C” or the “12”/“14”), the rules 
for how to interpret the center inscription become clear, it is either a “B” or a “13.”  Similarly, in 
the case of socio-economic value, I propose that a diamond (as on the right side of Figure 3) has 
a similar intuition/deliberation duality.  This diamond, standing by itself, conjures intuitive 
thoughts of its value, how big is it, what is its cut, color, and clarity?  However, upon further 
consideration of more deliberative details and in differing social contexts, other indications of 
Figure 3. Expressions of Intuition and Deliberation in Meaning versus in Economic Value 
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value emerge.  One might wonder what the rules and control regimes are of the diamond’s 
existence: is it synthetic, ethically-sourced, or even authentic?  The social constructs of the 
provenance of a diamond can range from it being lab-grown (which are actually more perfect 
than Earth-mined, but less valuable), sourced under forced labor or stolen (blood diamonds are 
perceived to have less value), loose or previously-set (how the marriage ended for the previously 
set diamond’s owners can affect its current perceived value), or is it actually cubic zirconia and a 
fraudulent “diamond”? 
Now, instead of a diamond, consider a person’s reaction to a Russian ruble and a euro – 
how might perceptions of the value of those two currencies differ, even if the amounts might buy 
the same goods and services in any given country?  How would individuals perceive a 500-rupee 
or 1000-rupee note, which India invalidated in 2016 (Economist, 2016), or any Venezuelan 
currency note, which the state initially invalidated at the end of that same year but later re-
validated because of backlash (Guardian, 2016)?  In this last scenario, what is an old note worth, 
and what is a new note worth – and to whom?  These understandings of value depend on the 
social-political context and the intuitive and deliberative associations that individuals within 
those contexts make. 
Kahneman (2002) suggests his System 2, deliberative cognition, is “relatively flexible 
and potentially rule-governed” – a control regime – while individuals trust their System 1 – 
intuitive cognition – based on a variety of mental cues accumulated from associative and 
emotional inputs, risks, and rewards.  These are markers of when trust can be formed or realized, 
and definitely when it is needed.  When trust is not needed, a rule-based system prevails.  In 
further explicating intuitive thought, Kahneman uses variations of the trust game discussed 
above to consider various scenarios where actors may contradict reasoned economic preferences 
 29 
in favor of heuristics and affective reasoning.  The actor arrives at a subjective value based on 
sliding scales of System 1 and System 2 thinking – that is, sliding scales of reliance on trust and 
rules – to assign an economic value. 
More to the point, I argue, the difference between the intuitive value of a currency and its 
deliberative value is the difference between the amount of trust or amount of control inherent in 
the currency system and the political and cultural contexts that underpin it, relative to the 
individual, not relative to a universal standard.  The perceptions of this difference are predicted 
on an individual users’ trust and control tolerances, motivations, and risk thresholds, which are 
not converging across society and may be diverging.  These perceptions are not assigned, as is 
typically assumed in monetary theory-based policy circles, based on individual calculations of 
face value, purchasing power, inflation, and other macro-economic indicators, those are only 
superficial aspects of the debate and convenient mathematics.  They are assigned based on a 
deeper human perception and cognitive assessment that underlies these perceived value 
assignments and that induces individual behavior.  However, an understanding of how currency 
system users make intuitive and deliberative judgments about the currency and that translates to 
the real-world of monetary and currency theory and currency is missing from the literature. 
But, extending the existing behavioral science research, Bart Nooteboom (2002) 
examines how trust explains (and drives down) transaction costs in all their incarnations: 
between individuals, between firms, and among and between individuals and organizations.  
Nooteboom rejects the idea that transaction costs can be solely attributed to self-interest, as it 
fails to account for altruism (trusting in a greater good), among other concepts.17  Nevertheless, 
Nooteboom suggests that unchecked trust – trust that is granted easily and unexamined for 
 
17 Kahneman’s “economic preferences” or even Adam Smith’s “self-interest” and “Invisible Hand” 
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proportion and reciprocity between the two parties – is “unlikely to survive in markets”; in his 
view, trust alone is an insufficient tool for regulating economic activity because it is vulnerable 
to abuse by the trusted, whether by lack of “appropriate information, mutuality of influence, 
encouragement of self-control” or onerous bureaucratic processes.  To this end, Nooteboom 
formally introduces the idea of governance and authority, and refers to those concepts simply as 
control, as a means of perfecting trust in economic activity and relationship building.  He 
explores this possibility through his research into the nature and details of a specific type of 
control mechanism, written contracts.  These can take the form of varying contractual 
possibilities (“communication elements”) that capture trusting parties’ expectations and provide 
the means to enumerate and enforce trust in a commercial transaction – primarily, through 
explicit and lengthy terms.  These control technologies can be refined over time.  Indeed, the 
Internet, Nooteboom noted back in 2002, was developing improved control mechanisms for 
traditional commercial activities.  In Nooteboom’s theory, more contract terms present in a 
contract were a sign of less trust involved in the relationship, and less economic value was 
created overall. 
The above discussion of trust from the perspectives of Fukuyama, Kahneman, and 
Nooteboom has repeatedly invoked limits or bounds on trust that can take the form of 
governance or other methods of authority and control.  Nooteboom characterizes this controlling 
mechanism as Information and Communication Technology (ICT), but he does so without the 
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apparent use of a significant independent theory about control.  Here I wish to introduce a theory 
of control that can complement Nooteboom and others’ notions of trust (and ICT specifically).18 
James R. Beniger (1989) describes the way in which the development of human life has 
required the constant and growing imposition of control – even from the very origins of life, in 
DNA, recalibrating information storage in cells.  Beniger traces this thread through the Stone 
Age to the Industrial Age: it is in the 19th century, he says, when the rapid change from 
traditional, natural (often haphazard) information systems gave way to increasingly ordered and 
rational information systems.  Citing Max Weber, Beniger points out that “the traditionalist 
attitude…had to be at least partly overcome in the Western World before the further 
development to the specifically modern type of rational capitalistic economy could take place” 
(ibid.).  Traditional relationships, Beniger argues, were highly predicated on trust mechanisms.  
In the 19th century, however, relationships became more transactional, and the loss of trust meant 
that transaction costs rose.  According to Beniger, modern control mechanisms rely on 
information management, feedback, and communication among social networks, with an 
increasing emphasis on bureaucratic systems, technological advances, and social structures.  
Beniger’s view of control systems situates them broadly in society, which complements 
Nooteboom’s perspective above where he analyzed tactical aspects of control mechanisms in 
contracts, correlating their existence with lower trust – and economic value.  This is reminiscent 
of Fukuyama’s (1992) examination of what social structures were needed for economic growth 
and development.  In Fukuyama’s view, democratic systems were the final state of highest 
 
18 Control is an abstract term but less so than the “slippery” (Nooteboom, 2002) concept of trust.  Control can have 
negative connotations, but the majority of its uses are arguably neutral.  In the trust game discussed above, recent 
research (Zak, 2017) has found that employees report they’d give up 20% of their salary for more control over how 
their role is executed.  This is a stunning link between trust, control, and economic value.  Thus, control has broad 
applications as being related to governance, administration, and influence. 
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economic potential, and traditional, individual-trust relationship structures were of less economic 
value.  However, this contradicts Nooteboom’s theories of trust and control, whereby higher 
economic value can be obtained without extensive control.  Can there be economic value with 
varying degrees of trust and control?  Are trust and control mutually exclusive, or do they coexist 
and correlate with different loci of value?  The literature suggests people find value in a spectrum 
of trust and control, and there is no single formula for what all users of currency might perceive 
as valuable.  As with the comparison above between the intuitive and deliberative perceptions of 
Kahneman’s “B”/”13” inscription and my metaphor of the diamond, the same symbols are 
believed to have different values by individual users in different control contexts. 
Addressing this literature to currency systems specifically, in the late 20th century, 
changes in international monetary theory upended hundreds of years of relatively calm currency 
system use (Galbraith, 1975).  Pre-modern social networks of trust – like the ancient Greeks’ 
resistance to the debasement of currency – were steadily replaced by modern systems of 
technology-mediated control – notably fractional reserve centralized banking – that defined and 
attempted to ensure economic value.  Nevertheless, communities have continued to find value in 
forms of exchange other than fiat money – forms that vary in their degrees of trust and control.  
One way that the trust of smaller social networks has been recaptured, for instance, is through 
complementary currency systems, currency systems created at the community level to be used in 
conjunction with national currencies; complementary currency systems have grown by organic 
means throughout communities of interest in recent decades. 
Examining the varied use of such complementary currency systems among different 
groups, Martignoni (2012) created several typological indicators for currency systems based on 
two axes: trust and currency-system purpose.  Extending some of the work of Thomas Greco, he 
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settled on the purpose, basis of trust, creation principle, and circulation principle as the scales for 
rating community currencies.  While his research was focused on complementary currency 
systems, this method was an instructive first step towards theorizing differences among broader 
socio-economic value systems and quantifying the systems under review.  Because he is 
characterizing the latent reasons for the currency system to exist and the authoritative basis for 
the user to trust the issuer – implying the importance of the attitudes of the system’s users – 
Martignoni’s typology provides an important first step towards a universal characterization of all 
currency systems. 
Larue (2020) created a conceptual framework for classifying currencies along the lines of 
official/alternative, participatory/non-participatory, and universal/bounded, yielding the matrix in 
Figure 4.  Larue’s matrix based on currency system characteristics is useful for comparing and 
contrasting systems, which can reveal relationships among them for exploring the field.  
However, this matrix does not provide an overall map of socio-economic qualities that lead to a 
currency type’s creation and use. 
 
Figure 4. Larue’s Classification of Currencies 
 
Building upon the past research and literature I have described, I propose a matrix of trust 
and control as a socio-economic typology for mapping currency systems – historical, present, 
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and future systems – that can be used, in turn, to generate a research methodology to test these 
theories.  Figure 5 is the proposed matrix for this research: 
 
 
This theoretical matrix’s axes are based on the three models discussed above 
(Nooteboom, Martignoni, and Pfajfar, et al.) and encompass the Venn diagram of the BIS 
Figure 5. Trust and Control Matrix of Currency System Types 
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“money flower” taxonomy of money, but I have extended those examples and theories by 
employing a more complex understanding of overall socio-economic value and exchange that 
covers the entirety of existing currency systems from an individual user perspective.  Chiefly, 
Nooteboom’s conception of trust is retained as the y-axis and his conception of control as the x-
axis; these two axes also correspond to the intuitive (trust) and deliberative (control) aspects of 
cognition that Kahneman theorized.  New labels developed for this research represent the range 
of each axis: self-interest to poli-interest on the y-axis and micro-control to macro-control on the 
x-axis.19  This 2 x 2 chart produces four broad types of currency systems: individual, physical, 
state, and social, and the details of each axes’ range are variations and gradations of societal 
factors, suggested by the research of Martignoni, Pfajfar, et al., as discussed above.  Each of 
these types of currency are further described below using examples of specific currency systems 
located in each of the quadrants defined by the trust and control axes.  Each type is discussed 
below, and Figure 6 summarizes the preceding discussion and introduces examples of each 
currency type. 
  
 
19 Poli-interest is a collective term for the opposite of self-interest, the low end of the trust y-axis.  Poli-interest 
includes concepts like sovereignty, community, and altruism. 
 36 
 
 
Individual types of currency: low trust in systems and governments 
The most basic form of any economic value and exchange system involves transactions 
that take place in a low-trust and low-control environment.20  Users of these systems would do so 
out of a need for immediate transactions that are often one-to-one and not expected to repeat.  
There is very little cognition needed: users need not consider sophisticated value judgments of 
political interest nor extensive transaction systems to make a determination about whether the 
transaction is beneficial to them and to execute it.  Individual currency systems fit best with the 
view that economic actors are rational agents, engaging in transactions in which both parties 
fully consider all the ramifications of each agreement.  Individual currency systems like Cohen’s 
permeate and plebian currencies or the Chinese renminbi are examples of this. 
 
20 Henceforth “economic value and exchange system” will just be referred to as a currency system that could include 
everything from barter to Bitcoin, for reference, see Figure 1. 
Figure 6. Detailed Typology with Arrayed Theory and Praxis of Currency Systems 
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Additionally, the most bare-bones of currency systems – one in which trust can be 
essentially absent – is barter.  Barter in its purest form is the direct, instantaneous exchange of 
two items of value, often services for goods, but sometimes goods for goods.  While barter has 
always been defined as a coincidence of wants, modern behavior as conducted on Freecycle.com 
or Craigslist.com (or previously via their now-defunct precursor: newspaper classified 
advertisements) could fit this description as well. 
However, while traditional, smaller-scale societies with a dense network of interpersonal 
relations were able to use barter extensively for value exchange, the numerous shortcomings of 
this system made it difficult to use exclusively.  The “coincidence of wants” that so typically 
describes barter can be severely limiting for members of a community that have deferred needs 
or a need to travel.  In fact, anthropologists have recently asserted there never was a pure barter 
society (Dodd, 2014).  Barter coexisted with proto-currency systems like gift economies that are 
highly subjective and personal to the actors in each transaction.  Because of these limitations, 
different kinds of money arose to complement low-trust, low- control cashless systems like 
barter and gifting.  These emergent systems increasingly were reliant on physical representations 
of the trust relationship between two trading partners. 
Physical types of currency: increased technologic control of currency systems 
While advances in information technology, cryptography, and distributed ledger 
technologies have led to the creation of the newest generation of what I call physical currencies, 
more basic technologies were used in the development of earlier forms.21  For millennia, 
 
21 “Physical” is used here to refer not only to any literally physical substance or inanimate object, but also to 
structured types of currencies that are found or created and to which value is assigned.  Thus, a rough gemstone, 
special crustacean shell, or even a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin based on complex mathematics share this quadrant of 
the trust and control matrix. 
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methods of harvesting nature (shells and commodity grains) or mining nature (rare metals or 
stones) have provided physical types of currencies.  These systems are not replacements for 
barter, but systems of physical currency that arose initially from the utility value of commodity 
items like beaver pelts and foodstuffs used in exchanges. 
Non-utility items, like precious metals and gems, would ultimately join those types of 
physical currency or shells and other immutable pieces of nature when functions like the store of 
value became more of a part of currency usage.  People were attracted to a gold nugget or natural 
diamond as a store of value and a medium of exchange because they knew it was highly durable 
and hard to obtain in increasing quantity.  The stones used as currency on the Island of Yap – 
each weighing hundreds of pounds – were also valuable for reasons that had little to do with their 
actual utility.22  These stones were carved and mined as ornate but barely movable units of 
money; their value was in their immense physical qualities, and the technology and processes 
associated with mining and transporting the stones.  These types of currencies shared an 
immutable nature and extensive technology and processes to create them that made them 
intrinsically valuable but of little utility. 
Thus, the other key characteristic of physical types of currencies is the way that 
technological processes create them or bring them into existence.  Specie currencies that were 
made from common commodity items like gold, silver, cowry shells, animal skins, or grains 
(Feingold, 2015) required specific technologies – rudimentary by today’s standard, but high-tech 
 
22 These stones were transported and then left in place to serve their currency function.  Indeed, anthropologist note, 
one stone fell off a boat in a lagoon during transport and was left in the lagoon to still serve its currency purpose for 
the users. 
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at the time – to create the currency and in many cases to use it.23  More recent developments in 
currency creation continue this tradition of using technological advances to capture an immutable 
quantity for two parties to use as a currency.  For example, cryptography and distributed ledger 
technologies allow digital currencies like Bitcoin to take on the quality of “digital gold,” a 
technologically processed and immutable store of value and medium of exchange.  In this sense, 
we can consider many cryptocurrencies to be “physical” currencies.  Users of these systems do 
not have to invoke any trust mechanics or beliefs in other users or in any given transaction.  The 
immutability of the medium involved in these physical types, cryptography especially, are 
rigorous and complex systems – highly ordered control structures and regimes – that require zero 
trust. 
State types of currency: administrative control of currency systems 
The purpose of sovereign currency systems was initially a combination of demonstrated 
technical prowess (originating with specie currencies, the ability to mine precious metal and then 
mint coins) and the desire to project a given head of state’s political strength, predicated on the 
trust (voluntary or involuntary) granted by the users of the currency to the sovereign.  The 
genesis of their adoption and use was through a mix of payment of sovereign employee salaries, 
payment to vendors and allies of the state for the procurement of state services, and forced 
remittance of taxes in the sovereign currency thus requiring subjects of the sovereign to accept 
the coin of the realm; citizens must use these currencies to do business within the political 
boundaries of the currency’s use, which gives rise to the demand of the sovereign currency.  This 
 
23These ancient systems of specie currency transaction are low technology by today’s standards but nonetheless 
process developments that bear the hallmarks of systems development and were high technology when first adopted 
as a currency.  Mining natural substances was ever more difficult, and assaying or minting gold or silver was a 
highly technical process, some of which was embarked upon for speculative investment reasons, apart from the mere 
desire to use the items as a medium of exchange – similar to how Bitcoin was envisioned by Nakamoto. 
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is understood to be a large component of the genesis of a currency’s value, but it can also have 
severe unintended consequences – for example, one of the original and most significant uses for 
sovereign currencies was to fund large public projects like wars, exploration, and colonization. 
For many centuries, sovereign currency was minted from specie currency, but over time, 
minted specie gave way to paper note-based currencies with limited intrinsic or and no utility 
value (cf. Gresham’s Law); in fact, to create intrinsic value they were minted or printed with 
significant iconography of the sovereign state even as their commodity value was decreased 
(debasement).  In the extreme, this ushered in an era of fiat currencies, or currencies that were 
imposed by issuing governments, whose value was based on macroeconomic and political 
considerations far removed from the individual users’ perceptions of the value of a transaction 
itself, or certainly the commodity or specie value of the currency.  Innes (1913) and Knapp 
developed a full theory of “state money” that has persisted to this day.  State money, in 
particular, requires an immense trust by the users of the system: trust in the currency’s value and 
trust in the systems and processes of the governmental entity that issued the currency and accepts 
it in taxes for the provision of public services as well as extensive control regimes.  These 
regimes create the circumstances for state currency’s payment to large numbers of government 
employees, allied states, and forced remittances for taxes, and for the exercise of war and 
colonization.  In modern times, colonization may have been replaced by globalization. 
Social types of currency: a virtuous cycle of trust 
Social types of currency are currency systems that seek to capture social values that state 
currencies fail to capture through traditional fiscal and monetary policy and the financial 
institutions that those policies enable.  The hallmark of this type of currency system is a high 
degree of intuitive trust associated with the currency system’s use and a strong belief in the 
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social purpose for which it was created, but a limited amount of actual control over its use and 
remittance.  One early social currency, in use in the 1930s, was the Austrian Wörgl, which 
thrived as a local currency exchange for goods and services in the Austrian town of Wörgl within 
the context of a global depression that had severely devalued national currencies around the 
world. 
However, perhaps the oldest social currency is a centuries-old system of financial 
settlement called hawala.  While not necessarily a traditional currency in the sense of an 
identifiable single unit of account, hawala is a complex economic settlement process for 
transferring economic value over large distances and time, often across political and economic 
borders (Jost & Sandhu, 2003).  Highly prevalent in Muslim countries and the Muslim diaspora, 
hawala is an unregulated financial system that relies on deep cultural trust (Qorchi, Wilson, & 
Maimbo, 2003) where a complete transaction utilizes various economic means and instruments 
over an extended time, sometimes months or years, for settlement.  Some scholars argue that part 
of the reason this ancient financial settlement process works is that Muslim cultures see money 
as not an end in itself but rather a means to other social purposes (Irfan, 2015), which, in part, 
leads to a high degree of trust needed for the system to work.  At the same time, it does not 
require or use a centralized authority or a formal system of control; hawala settlements occur 
organically, according to custom and through distributed economic transactions, over time. 
Other currency systems of the social type include complementary currencies, described 
earlier.  These currencies are specifically designed to spur local economic development, 
community building, and social value transfer in cities, towns, and regions.  Though none of 
them has achieved widespread adoption, complementary currencies have attracted interest 
worldwide over the last several decades.  Proponents of these currencies design these systems to 
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be based on local community economic needs that are not subject to central bank authority or 
political manipulation.  These proponents criticize central bank monetary policy as privileging 
private-sector production and missing public-good creation. Society needs monetary systems that 
fully address society’s monetary needs, they argue, and as complements to fiat currencies, these 
systems can provide a hedge against the unpredictable and negative effects of economic cycles 
(Lietaer & Dunne, 2013). 
The critiques of fiat money posed by advocates of complementary currencies echo those 
of social theorists like Zelizer and Bandelj (2012), who contend that traditional economic 
theories of money (state systems as described above) lack community and social value and 
meaning.  Indeed, they assert, rather than a universal equivalent model of socio-economic value, 
“developing a sociological model of multiple monies is part of a broader challenge to neo-
classical economic theory” (Zelizer, 1989) because neo-classical economic theory has 
consistently ignored the existence of other currencies, which includes the range of 
complementary currencies.  In particular, these theorists argue that fiat money fails to account for 
transactions relating to emotional labor and relational work, which could be better captured by 
community currencies because of community currencies’ focus on the holistic socio-economic 
needs of society.  Indeed, the goal of complementary currencies is to tangibly capture community 
value production (e.g., local artisans and local farmers, barter, volunteer work) and allow that 
captured value to be traded within the community by other producers and consumers of the 
social value. 
Importantly, because these currencies cannot be used outside the community of their 
creation and exchange, there is no net loss of economic value from spending the currency 
elsewhere (remittances in a macro-economic sense, or as simple as buying goods on the internet 
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from another region and having them shipped in).  These currencies are transmitted to and from 
other merchants and customers who value the community effort involved, providing more local 
benefit than the same commodity or produce purchased at a grocery store, which may be 
harvested outside the community, state, or even country.  The complementary currency is then 
circulated among participating community merchants for goods and services.  Further illustrating 
this difference is the belief that globalization and transnational currencies strengthen geopolitical 
ties, which has the unintended consequence of weakening local community ties. 
Often these currencies are referred to as “time banks” and the “monetization of time” 
because there is a heavy bias towards time itself being the differentiator between a locally-
produced good or service versus a foreign-produced good or service.  Complementary currencies 
can also be used in place of national currencies to promote certain types of socially beneficial 
transactions.  For example, complementary currencies could be used to compensate an ex-
convict for doing community service that may have a national currency value of below minimum 
wage but that has a local currency value of more than minimum wage.  The social benefit is two-
fold, consisting of the real work done (e.g., collecting litter from a park) and the net addition of 
the complementary currency compensated labor to the local community from an otherwise 
difficult-to-employ-for-national-currency worker. 
In Ithaca, New York, the first significant complementary currency system in the U.S. – 
the Ithaca HOURS – was created in 1991 (Glover, 2018).  The Ithaca HOURS system connects 
local merchants and volunteer and community service organizations to facilitate the exchange of 
goods and services for community service hours spent by the participants.  The chit a supporter 
earns is a piece of paper denominated in hours invested in the community.  Similarly, the 
Piedmont area of North Carolina started a complementary currency system in 2001 called 
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PLENTY, which has helped economic development efforts by keeping economic activity locally 
circulating within participating merchants.  Baltimore, Maryland, started a BNote in 2010, one of 
the more successful systems in the United States, which has encouraged recirculation of local 
resources and community economic interests.  The UK and Western Europe have dozens of 
similar systems, and around the world, hundreds are serving to support intra-community trade in 
ways that, their proponents argue, national currency systems cannot (Seyfang & Longhurst, 
2018). 
Notably, complementary currencies foster economic growth while at the same time 
auguring greater awareness and acceptance of denationalized currencies and the promise they 
hold for economic security.  These complementary currencies require a high degree of trust 
because they focus on communities of interest in ways that are not deliberatively measured – that 
is, there is no mathematical way to measure the strengthening of the social fabric of a 
community.  The participants in the system are involved because of an interest in creating or 
participating in a system that is larger than the individual member; their interest is in the 
flourishing of the political community to which they belong, and this orientation requires 
substantial levels of altruism.  However, these social currency systems do not require much in 
the way of control.  They are essentially volunteer systems and are not, for instance, mandated 
for use to pay taxes or other obligatory political-economic behaviors. 
Hypotheses 
Drawing from the theory of trust and control described above, this study examined trust, 
control, and cultural factors that may account for why people have positive or negative 
perceptions or choose to use or avoid Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies.  The research theory of trust 
and control implies that, for physical types of currency like Bitcoin, state policies will matter less 
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in explaining trends in usage and expressed approval, while economic development (which 
allows for widespread citizen usage of cryptocurrencies) and lack of citizen trust in government 
(which makes state-sponsored fiat currencies less attractive) will matter relatively more.  
Therefore, to test the matrix of trust and control and explore the basis for the perceptions and 
usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, the following hypotheses were constructed: 
Control: public policy 
H1a: Countries with more restrictive policies regarding the use of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies will have more negative perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
H1b: Countries with more restrictive policies regarding the use of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies will have lower usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
Culture: socio-economic development 
H2a: Countries with more developed economies will have more positive perceptions of 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
H2b: Countries with more developed economies will have higher usage of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies. 
Trust: attitudes of trust in society and of government 
H3a: Countries with lower levels of trust in society and government will have more 
positive perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
H3b: Countries with lower levels of trust in society and government will have higher 
usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
Hypotheses H1a and H1b were constructed based on general monetary theory-based 
premises and specifically on theories like the OCA and ACU, or Gresham’s Law, that are 
predicated on the idea that individual user’s behavior is purely rational and can be influenced by 
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public policy, or that public policy is designed and intended to have these types of effects.  
Testing for public policy control mechanisms’ relationships to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency 
perceptions and usage also tests the theories of Kahneman and Nooteboom that promote the idea 
that levels of governance and authority are critical components to establishing socio-economic 
valuations through currencies.  Two hypotheses were used to differentiate between the potential 
differences in perception versus use. 
Hypotheses H2a and H2b were constructed based on Cohen’s currency pyramid, which 
assumes theories of ACU are valid, and the theory that currency systems are differentiated by 
their underlying country of existence based on macro-economic metrics.  In the case of Bitcoin 
and cryptocurrency, that might ultimately correspond to a trans-global community so this 
research and these hypotheses examined the perceptions and use per-country based on Cohen’s 
theory per-country as a proxy for who might have higher perceptions and usage to these new 
global currencies.  Testing these hypotheses will provide insight into the relationship of Bitcoin 
and cryptocurrency to other national currencies and as standalone currencies.  As with H1, two 
H2 hypotheses were used to test for differences between perceptions and usage. 
Finally, H3a and H3b were constructed based on overall trust questions – trust in others 
and trust in the government – as a basis for currency system perceptions and use.  Fukuyama, 
Kahneman, and Nooteboom view trust as half of the differentiation of socio-economic value (the 
other half being control), so testing trust attitudes related to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency as 
discussed will provide a means to validate the overall trust and control matrix to effectively 
characterize currency systems.  Again, two sub-hypotheses were created to consider differences 
between mere perceptions and actual use. 
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Methodology 
Research variables and process model 
This study involved a quantitative multivariate principal component analysis (PCA) of 
factors with ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of possible policy, trust, and cultural 
factors driving the perceptions and usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency around the world. It also 
sought to assess which set of factors – levels of trust in society and government, socio-economic 
development, and state control over Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies – may have a greater influence 
on perceptions and usage based on the idea that currencies are both social and economic 
phenomena, social constructs not necessarily established by or reliant on the state.  Figure 7 
below depicts an initial conceptual process model of the variables.
 
Figure 7. Research Variables and Conceptual Process Model 
 
Dependent variable type #1 – perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
This variable measured personal perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency as a store of 
value or medium of exchange.  To measure this, a dataset created by ING Group in 2018 (Exton, 
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2018) for their behavioral economics department’s market research on personal financial and 
monetary issues was used.  This research was conducted with a survey instrument generated in 
collaboration with Ipsos on behalf of ING Group and distributed through ING Group market 
channels by Ipsos.  ING Group fielded the survey in the spring of 2018 across 15 countries and 
obtained approximately 1,000 responses per country in response to six questions measuring 
personal perceptions and usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies.  The total sample size was 
14,828.  A portion of the actual survey instrument related to the cryptocurrency questions listed 
below is included in Appendix A. 
These measurements were analyzed individually with the goal of determining what might 
be a useful index for Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perception and usage as part of the analysis.  In 
all cases, values were recorded or recoded to be higher for more favorable perception or higher 
usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.  The following measurements were used: 
1. Have you ever heard of cryptocurrency? If so, do you own any? [three mutually 
exclusive optioned statements seeking a “Yes” or “No”] 
1. I have heard of cryptocurrency 
2. I own some cryptocurrency 
3. I expect to own cryptocurrency in the future 
Responses to these questions were recorded as “Yes” (1) or “No” (0), with an 
affirmative to each successive question considered to be more positive and increasing 
the favorability of the respondent’s view of cryptocurrency.  If the respondent 
answers “No” to the first question, the survey ends for the cryptocurrency section.  
The respondent could have answered “Yes” to owning cryptocurrency and then “No” 
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to expecting to own cryptocurrency, which would lower the overall positivity of the 
respondent’s attitude. 
2. Crypto-money or cryptocurrency is a kind of digital currency. This currency is not 
created nor secured by the government, but by a network of individuals. Bitcoin is the 
best-known example. 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 
1. “Digital currencies – such as Bitcoins – are the future of spending online” 
2. “Digital currencies – such as Bitcoins – are the future of investment as storage 
of value” 
3. “I think the value of digital currencies – such as Bitcoins – will increase in the 
next 12 months" 
Answers to these questions were recorded with Likert-style scalar values of: 
“Strongly agree” (5), “Agree” (4), “Neither agree nor disagree” (3), “Disagree” (2), 
and “Strongly disagree” (1).  Responses of “I don’t have an opinion” were treated as 
missing data.  Higher recorded values for each question were considered a more 
positive perception of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency. 
3. Cryptocurrencies are a type of asset. How would you compare the risk of owning 
cryptocurrency compared to the following alternative assets? 
Cash, Government bonds, Stock market investment, Real estate/property funds, Gold, 
Investing in your own business 
Answers to each type of asset were recorded with a Likert-style scalar from 1-5 
corresponding to these options: 
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1. Much lower risk compared to holding cryptocurrency 
2. Lower risk compared to holding cryptocurrency 
3. About the same risk as holding cryptocurrency 
4. Higher risk compared to holding cryptocurrency 
5. Much higher risk compared to holding cryptocurrency 
Higher recorded values for each question were considered a more positive perception 
of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency. 
4. If you had money available (about 1 month’s take-home/net pay) and you wanted 
some more information on cryptocurrency as a possible investment, where would you 
most likely get advice?  
1. I don’t know  
2. I (would) never invest money in cryptocurrency 
3. An online computer program or algorithm that provides tailored advice 
4. The internet and specialist websites 
5. My friends/My family 
6. An independent financial advisor or bank advisor 
Higher recorded values for each question were considered a more positive perception 
of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency. 
5. Would you use cryptocurrencies – such as Bitcoin – for the following activities if you 
had the option? 
1. Buy cup of coffee 
2. Receive your take-home pay 
3. Pay taxes 
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4. Pay your monthly electricity bill 
5. Buy a plane fare 
6. Make an international payment for a product you buy online 
7. Save for your child’s university fees 
Responses to each of these activities were recorded as a binary “Yes”/“No” to each 
question, with only the first option for a “Yes” – “Yes” for the activity – being 
mutually exclusive from the rest.  Respondents could say no for multiple reasons. 
1. Yes 
2. No, I don’t want to change the way I pay 
3. No, I think there would be too much risk 
4. No, Bitcoin is interesting to me only as an investment 
Dependent variable type #2 – usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
There are many ways to operationalize the dependent variable of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency usage.  Usage can take many forms, some of which translate to traditional 
currency system uses despite the novelty of cryptocurrency.  Metrics such as transaction volume, 
ATM (fiat/cryptocurrency conversion) distribution, and offline, local exchange provide measures 
similar to those employed to measure national currency use.  But cryptocurrency also has usage 
metrics such as mining activity, fiat exchange rates, and location and number of cryptocurrency 
exchanges that are not shared by central bank currencies.  The cryptocurrency distributed ledgers 
(blockchains) and growing network of websites that analyze the chains provide ample 
information about: 
1. where nodes on the network reside 
2. number of markets or exchanges in a country 
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3. the number of bitcoins produced by a given node 
4. overall market capitalization of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency in a given country’s 
national currency 
5. transaction volume per country 
6. calculated exchange rate of a unit of national currency to bitcoin 
7. production of new bitcoins (mining) 
8. interest in what Bitcoin is and learning about it 
9. availability of digital currency and fiat holders to trade offline  
10. availability of Bitcoin ATMs 
As described below, the above measures were created as dependent variables measuring 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions and usage. The following primary three measurements 
were used to measure this variable.  These were selected as primary dependent usage variables 
because they relate directly to individual action to use Bitcoin and cryptocurrency (in this case 
these measures were specifically focused on Bitcoin) and therefore most closely represent the 
dimension of usage measured by the ING/Ipsos survey instrument discussed above.  The rest 
were considered Other Metrics for exploratory consideration. 
Interest in Bitcoin (BI) 
For this measure, I reviewed the internet search trends in each country from Google 
Trends for the term “bitcoin.”  Before the citizens of a country can use a cryptocurrency, they 
must learn about them and how to participate and transact with them.  The Google Trends 
reports, which began in 2004, have been widely used to analyze data on popular trends and 
interests.  Google provides an Interest over Time measure that represents: 
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search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and 
time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that 
the term is half as popular. A score of 0 means there was not enough data for this 
term. 
For this research, five years of search trends for the query term “bitcoin” 
[https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&q=bitcoin] were used.  Based on 
Google’s Internet over Time measure, I coded this variable as an integer from 0 to 100 for each 
country as of May 31, 2018. 
Availability of Bitcoin ATMs (AB) 
This variable measured the demand for access to Bitcoins as a medium of exchange for 
retail purposes.  This variable was defined as the number of Bitcoin ATMs available in a given 
country and recorded as a whole number from coinatmradar.com as of May 31, 2018. 
Bitcoin nodes (BN) 
This variable was defined as the number of Bitcoin nodes per country measured by 
nodes.earn.com, the only aggregator of Bitcoin nodes.  It was recorded as a whole number of 
nodes reachable as of May 31, 2018.  This provided insight into a society’s interest and 
capability in creating and running nodes on the Bitcoin network. 
Other usage measures for Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
The following metrics were also defined to provide context regarding the emergence of 
Bitcoin in the sample countries.  There were limitations to their value in answering the study’s 
research questions, however, because of the conflation of currency uses that underpin these 
metrics and the overall quality of these measurements to effectively measure the activity.  For the 
completeness of this research, these metrics were defined to better understand the phenomena of 
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cryptocurrency and its novelty.  They also were intended to be used to see if these measurements 
had any statistical value when analyzed with the other variables. 
Offline exchange of Bitcoin (OB) 
This variable measured the availability and interest in trading Bitcoin offline in exchange 
for other currencies.  This variable was defined as the number of Bitcoins offered for sale in a 
given country via the peer-to-peer crypto exchange site localbitcoin.com, the only aggregator of 
international non-electronic cryptocurrency exchange.24  It was recorded as a whole or decimal 
fraction of the number of coins per country as of May 31, 2018. 
A second measurement was defined as the number of Bitcoins offered to buy in a given 
country via the peer-to-peer crypto exchange site localbitcoin.com, the only aggregator of 
international non-electronic cryptocurrency exchange.  It was recorded as a whole or decimal 
fraction of the number of coins per country as of May 31, 2018. 
Bitcoin investment (BI) 
This variable was defined as the market capitalization of Bitcoin per country from 
cryptocompare.com, one of the top commercial aggregators of cryptocurrency data.  It was 
recorded as a rounded number to the nearest million in USD as of May 31, 2018.  This provided 
a sense of which nations have individuals who have chosen to use Bitcoins in addition to or in 
place of their national currencies. 
Bitcoin transaction (BT) 
This variable was defined as the transaction volume of Bitcoin per country from 
Blockchain.info.  It was recorded as a whole number rounded to the nearest thousand as of May 
 
24 At the time of this research, localbitcoin.com was the only aggregator of international non-electronic 
cryptocurrency exchange.  Since then Paxful has emerged as a similar service. 
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31, 2018.  It was intended to measure which nations have a transactional (trading and 
purchasing) interest in Bitcoin. 
Bitcoin fiat exchange (BF) 
This variable was defined as the exchange rate for Bitcoin to the national currency on the 
Coinmarketcap.com website.  It was recorded as a whole number of the cryptocurrency exchange 
market rate for Bitcoin in each country’s currency and converted to USD based on market 
figures and exchange rate data from the U.S Federal Reserve weekly foreign exchange rates for 
the week ending June 2, 2018.25  This measured the relative strength of a given nation’s current 
unit of currency in relation to Bitcoin. 
Bitcoin creation (BC) 
This variable was defined as coin production per country from Blockchain.info, one of 
the longest-standing, open-source blockchain viewers for the Bitcoin digital currency.  It was 
recorded as the number of coins or fractions thereof for the 31-day period ending on May 31, 
2018.  It measured individuals’ willingness and ability to devote resources to the production and 
creation of Bitcoin (mining). 
Bitcoin markets (BM) 
This variable was defined as the number of in-country cryptocurrency exchanges, as 
measured by Coinmarketcap.com, the largest aggregator of cryptocurrency markets and 
exchange data.  It was recorded as a whole number as of May 31, 2018.  It measured the number 
of markets/exchanges that have been set up to purchase or exchange cryptocurrencies. 
  
 
25 https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/default.htm 
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Post-data collection removal of these measurements 
After further review and attempts to collect these Other Metrics during the latter months 
of 2018 and early 2019, these Other Metrics, while already speculative in early phases of the 
research have, over time, become even less tenuous as reliable and valid metrics to collect and on 
which to base any – even exploratory – analysis.  In consequence, they could not be fully and 
reliably collected so were neither completed for this research nor were they included in any 
results or analysis. 
It is instructive that these potentially reasonable measures of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency, 
measurements that are endemic of typical monetary theory-based approaches, are probably not 
viable measurements of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies.  This is both a confounding symptom and 
by-product of the nature of these forms of currency relative to traditional currencies. 
Independent variable type #1 – public policy 
This set of variables provided insight into whether and how particular public policies 
regulate the usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies and thereby shape or were shaped by public 
attitudes toward them.  Given the difficulty of regulating such virtual transactions, however, the 
extent to which policy can affect perception and usage was unclear.  Of the measurement 
variables collected for this research, public policy factors are the most complicated to determine 
and measure.  While the obscurity of cryptocurrency use is a challenge, public policy metrics are 
more so because there are myriad types of policies related to any of the numerous traits of 
cryptocurrency use.  Related to that, public institutions each have different aspects they regulate, 
and each country can have clear, vague, or nuanced positions – intentionally or not – on each of 
these factors.  Indeed, even the varying legislative and executive bodies in the same country can 
have differing or opposing views on any given matter – and change those views monthly. 
 57 
However, what has emerged in recent years is a growing amount of industry and 
journalistic attention to the quickly changing regulatory environment.  For this research, two 
useful rubrics were reviewed from recent non-academic efforts to describe and assess relevant 
public policies.  The first is from a website called Coin Dance (Blockchain Ventures, 2018), 
which has been operating for several years in the sector.  Coin Dance’s primary information 
dissemination is related to the sorts of cryptocurrency statistics described in the variables above 
(ATMs, nodes).  Additionally, it also has a long-standing chart of 246 countries and regions that 
tracks in-country Bitcoin and cryptocurrency regulatory support and 16 countries’ political party 
and candidate support of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.  While the data itself in this site (generated 
mostly by user submission) was not considered authoritative, the manner in which the policy 
positions were tracked was useful to build a variable for this research. 
In addition to Coin Dance, Bloomberg Quint (a partnership with U.S.-based Bloomberg 
News and India-based Quintillion Media) recently created a matrix of 22 countries’ public policy 
positions on a range of cryptocurrency regulatory matters (Bloomberg News, 2018).  The 
Bloomberg Quint matrix is more complete in policy positions and the number of countries 
reviewed than previous publicly released industry or journalistic attempts to measure digital 
currency regulations; it is also from a well-respected business news organization.  However, like 
the Coin Dance policy chart, it was only used for a model of how to collect policy positions and 
was not considered authoritative data itself. 
To executed my measurement of the national policy environments for Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies, I created a matrix that integrated aspects of the Coin Dance regulatory tracking 
model with the Bloomberg Quint reporting model and then sought authoritative data to populate 
the final matrix.  The policy variables described below were constructed to provide higher values 
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when the policy is more favorable to digital currency and lower values when the policy is less 
favorable.  Therefore, the aggregate index of these policy measurements will be higher when a 
country is more supportive of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency and lower when a country is less 
supportive of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.  I developed the following variables: 
• Bitcoin and cryptocurrency legality – a measure of the relative legality of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency in the sample country 
o Ordinal classification as: Illegal, Restricted, Neutral, Legal 
o Modified Likert-style measurement recorded as an integer from 0-3 
o A country with no public regulatory positions on Bitcoin and cryptocurrency 
was coded as missing data 
• Bitcoin and cryptocurrency classification policy – a measure of which property of 
currency the sample country considers Bitcoin and cryptocurrency to be 
o Ordinal classification as: No Position, Barter/Good, Commodity, Property, 
Currency/Money 
o Modified Likert-style measurement recorded as an integer from 0-4 
o These classifications are broadly defined along a spectrum of an asset versus a 
security and are common types that follow the U.S. Securities and Exchanges’ 
“Howey Test” 
• Cryptocurrency exchange – a measure of the regulatory environment for 
cryptocurrency exchanges 
o Ordinal classification as: Illegal, Restricted, Neutral, Legal 
o Modified Likert-style measurement recorded as an integer from 0-3 
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o A country with no public regulatory position on this issue was coded as 
“missing data” 
• Initial coin offering – a measure of whether ICOs are permitted to be offered in the 
country 
o Ordinal classification as: Illegal, Restricted, Neutral, Legal 
o Modified Likert-style measurement recorded as an integer from 0-3 
o A country with no public regulatory position on this issue was coded as 
“missing data” 
• Bitcoin and cryptocurrency political support – a measure of the number of political 
entities openly supporting/accepting Bitcoin and cryptocurrency 
o Types of entities could include: Political Party, Candidate, Officeholder, Other 
o Measurement recorded as an integer from 0-n based on the quantities of 
entities which support or accept Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
o This measurement was recorded from the website CoinDance.com, the only 
aggregator of such data 
• Cryptocurrency payments – a measure of whether cryptocurrency payments are 
permitted in-country 
o Binary classification as: “No” (0) or “Yes” (1) 
• Fiat conversion – a measure of whether Bitcoin and cryptocurrency can be bought 
with the national currency 
o Binary classification as: “No” (0) or “Yes” (1) 
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• Planned legislation or regulation – a measure of whether Bitcoin and cryptocurrency 
public policy has been identified as a research topic for any formal body of the 
government 
o Binary classification as: “No” (0) or “Yes” (1) 
• Bitcoin and cryptocurrency warning – a measure of whether public policy arbiters 
have issued warnings about Bitcoin and cryptocurrency use 
o Binary classification as: “No” (0) or “Yes” (1) 
Four authoritative sources of national policy positions were used to measure these 
metrics, as follows: 
1. Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World, Library of Congress – Law 
Section, June 2018 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-
survey.php 
2. Regulation of Bitcoin in Selected Jurisdictions, Library of Congress – Law 
Section, January 2014 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/index.php 
3. Is Bitcoin Legal?, CoinDesk, July 2018 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/is-bitcoin-legal 
4. For the political parties and politician count, the Coin Dance – Politics & Opinion 
– Global Bitcoin Political Support & Public Opinion page was reviewed; 
https://coin.dance/poli [retrieved 9/29/2019] 
Independent variable type #2 – socio-economics and culture 
Independent variable type #2’s societal factors were derived from Cohen’s currency 
pyramid theory of currency system types and their related host countries.  Cohen’s theory 
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describes a range of usage of national currency types within each country based on societal 
factors within that country.  Inspired by this approach, I used the following societal factors: 
• Economic 
a. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – a measure of the GDP of the sample country 
based on World Bank data, recorded as a number rounded to the nearest 
billion as of 2018. 
b. Gini coefficient of inequality – a measure of the distribution of wealth in the 
country as of 2018 as collected by World Bank, recorded as a decimal number 
from 0.0 to 1.0 for the year 2018. 
c. Remittance volume – a measure of the volume of remittances to the country as 
collected by World Bank, recorded as an integer rounded to the nearest ten 
million for May 2018. 
• Technological 
a. Internet Freedom – a measure of the degree of digital or technologic freedom 
present within in the country from the Freedom House Internet Freedom 
(FHIF) ranking for the sample country, recorded as a whole number for the 
most recent year available (a mix of 2018 and 2019 based on availability from 
secondary sources) of both composite index and categorical values. 
b. Broadband adoption – a measure of the number of subscribers to broadband 
internet throughout the sample country as collected by the International 
Telecommunication Union World Telecommunication/ICT Development for 
Fixed Broadband in total and percentage of the population for the most recent 
year available. 
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c. Internet spending – a measure of the amount of economic activity that is done 
on the internet in the sample country.  This measurement indicates the level of 
adoption and comfort with activities on the internet as collected by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development in the B2C E-commerce 
Index 2018. 
d. Mobile phone ownership – a measure of the number of mobile phones in use 
per 100 people within the sample country as collected by the International 
Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Development for 
Mobile Cellular (broadband) in total and as a percentage of the population for 
the most recent year available. 
e. Energy (electricity) cost per kWh – this measurement variable will be 
obtained from the IEA for OECD Countries, Energy Prices and Taxes, 3rd 
Quarter 2019 (for 2018 metrics); non-OECD Countries, World Energy Prices, 
2019 (for 2018 metrics), recorded for residential and commercial rates. 
• Human development 
a. United Nations Development Program Human Development Index (UNDP 
HDI) – a measure of the level of development of the sample country, recorded 
as a whole number index value for the most recent year available. 
b. Educational level – a measure of the percentage of the population with a 
college degree in the sample country based on OECD data, recorded as a 
number rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent as of 2018. 
c. Happiness – a measure of the amount of reported happiness in the sample 
country as collected by the United Nations Sustainable Development 
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Solutions Network (UNSDSN), recorded as an integer for the most recent year 
available. 
d. Crime (major/violent) – a measure of the amount of major/violent crime per 
100,000 people of the sample country based on the number of homicides per 
100,000 people in the sample country as collected by the OECD in the Better 
Life Index, recorded as a number rounded to the nearest tenth as of 2018. 
e. Feel safe walking at night – a measure of the number of people reporting they 
feel safe at night in the sample country as collected by the OECD in the Better 
Life Index, recorded as a percentage rounded to the nearest decimal as of 
2018. 
f. Percent urbanization –a measure of the percentage of the landmass that has 
been developed within the sample country based on urban land area 
percentage as collected by the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network (CIESIN)/Columbia University, recorded as a number 
rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent for the most recent data available. 
g. Percent urban population – a measure of the percentage of the population that 
lives in urbanized areas a (percentage of the total population) as collected by 
the United Nations Population Division World Urbanization Prospects: 2018 
Revision, recorded to the nearest tenth of a percent. 
h. Land area – a measure of the total size of the country as collected by the 
World Bank, recorded to nearest integer from the most recent reported size. 
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• Demographic 
a. Net migration – a measure of the net migration quantity of migrants as 
reported by the United Nations Population Div. World Population Prospects: 
2019 Rev., recorded as a number rounded to the nearest 100K as of 2018. 
b. Net migration rate – a measure of the number of immigrants minus the 
number of emigrants over a period, divided by the person-years lived by the 
population of the receiving country over that period.  It is expressed as the 
average annual net number of migrants per 1,000 population as reported by 
the United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects: 2019 
Revision, recorded as a number rounded to the nearest decimal as of 2018. 
c. Population – a measure of the size of the population in the sample country as 
reported by the United Nations Population Div. World Population Prospects: 
2019 Rev., recorded as a number rounded to the nearest 100K as of 2018. 
d. Population density – a measure of the density of the population in the sample 
country as people per sq./km of land area as collected by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization and World Bank population estimates, recorded as a 
number rounded to the nearest whole person per square kilometer as of 2018. 
• Monetary 
Measuring a country’s currency system relative to other currency systems is an important 
component of this research and is based partially on Cohen’s currency pyramid, where the U.S. 
dollar is positioned at the top and the next two currencies are the Japanese yen and European 
euro.  By taking measurements for the rest of the countries relative to the three dominant fiat 
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currencies in the world, I constructed a measure of the subject country’s currency strength.  Two 
commodity-gold measurements were added as a baseline of monetary strength for each country. 
• Strength of foreign exchange of currency to USD – a measure of the relative strength 
of a given nation’s current unit of currency to U.S. dollars as collected by the website 
x-rates.com’s weekly foreign exchange rates for the week ending June 2, 2018. 
• Strength of foreign exchange of currency to CNY – a measure of the relative strength 
of a given nation’s current unit of currency to Chinese yen as collected by the website 
x-rates.com’s weekly foreign exchange rates for the week ending June 2, 2018. 
• Strength of foreign exchange of currency to EUR – a measure of the relative strength 
of a given nation’s current unit of currency to the euro as collected by the website x-
rates.com’s weekly foreign exchange rates for the week ending June 2, 2018. 
• Cost in national currency for an ounce of gold – a measure of the relative strength of 
a given nation’s current unit of currency to an ounce of gold as the exchange rate for 
the national currency to an ounce of gold as collected by the industry monitoring 
website xe.com for the week ending June 2, 2018. 
• Gold reserves – a measure of the amount of gold on reserve by a country as reported 
by the World Gold Council and consisting of five separate metrics by a sample 
country for the most recent year: 
a. The amount of gold in tonnes [sic] on reserve 
b. The amount of gold in USD on reserve by a sample country 
c. The foreign exchange reserves less gold 
d. The foreign exchange reserves with gold 
e. The percent of foreign exchange reserves as gold 
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Independent variable type #3 – trust in society and government 
Individual trust others and in government 
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a global social science research project started in 
1981 that seeks to capture the “changing values [of the citizens of each country] and their import 
on social and political life” in approximately 100 countries.  The measurement of trust in society 
and in government was done by using six questions from the sixth wave (iteration) of this 
project, the 2014 WVS (Inglehart, et al., 2014), that focus on a respondent’s views of who they 
trust in society, what constitutes democracy, and their perceptions of trust in their government.  
For countries not in the WVS sample, the European Values Study (EVS) 2017 (European Values 
Study, 2018) was used.  The EVS is nearly identical to the WVS and initially was used in the 
1970s, before the first WVS wave in 1981.  The EVS covers fewer countries overall than the 
WVS so it was only used if the country was not sampled in the WVS.  The questions used were: 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people?  
Answers to this question were recorded as a binary 0 or 1: 1 Most people can be 
trusted | 0 Need to be very careful. 
2. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, 
somewhat, not very much or not at all? 
a) Your family 
b) Your neighborhood 
c) People you know personally 
d) People you meet for the first time 
e) People of another religion 
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f) People of another nationality 
Answers to this question were recorded with a Likert-style scalar according to this 
coding: 1 – Trust completely; 2 – Trust somewhat; 3 – Do not trust very much; 4 
– Do not trust at all. 
3. How much confidence does the respondent have in these organizations? 
a) The churches 
b) The armed forces 
c) The press 
d) Television 
e) Labor unions 
f) The police 
g) The courts 
h) The government (in your nation’s capital) 
i) Political parties 
j) Parliament 
k) The Civil service 
l) Universities 
Answers to this question were recorded with a Likert-style scalar according to this 
coding: 1 – a great deal of confidence; 2 – quite a lot of confidence; 3 – not very 
much confidence; 4 - none at all. 
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4. Which is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this 
country? 
a) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections. 
b) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they 
think is best for the country 
c) Having the army rule 
d) Having a democratic political system 
Answers to this question were recorded with a Likert-style scalar: 1 is Very good; 
2 is Fairly good; 3 is Fairly bad; 4 is Very bad. 
5. For each of the following things how essential is it as a characteristic of democracy? 
a) Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 
b) Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws. 
c) People choose their leaders in free elections. 
d) People receive state aid for unemployment. 
e) The army takes over when government is incompetent. 
f) Civil rights protect people from state oppression. 
g) The state makes people’s incomes equal. 
h) People obey their rulers. 
i) Women have the same rights as men. 
Answers to this question were recorded with a scalar of 1-10, where 1 means “not 
at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an 
essential characteristic of democracy.” 
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6. How important is it to live in a country that is governed democratically? 
Answers to this question were recorded with a scalar from 1-10, where 10 means 
it is “not at all important” and 1 means “absolutely important.” 
7. How democratically is this country being governed today? 
Answers to this question were recorded with a scalar from 1 to 10, where 10 
means that it is “not at all democratic” and 1 means that it is “completely 
democratic.” 
Democratic governance 
Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (EIUDI) (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2018) tracks the status of the establishment of democracy in 165 countries around the world 
among five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of 
government, political participation, and political culture.  Countries are scored along 60 variables 
and assigned a whole number value as one of four types 1-4: 1 full democracy, 2 flawed 
democracy, 3 hybrid regime, and 4 authoritarian regime. 
For this study, I constructed a democratic governance variable utilizing the tracking done 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit for democratic institutions in the sample countries from the 
most recently available assessment, 2018.  The variable was recorded as a whole number of the 
country’s rank in measured democratic status. 
Research design 
Design type 
The research design was a cross-sectional research study of countries that have residents 
who use Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.  This fulfilled the goal of the research questions to capture 
the measurement variables at a point in time to analyze the relationships.  The IV/DV 
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measurements were strictly quantitative in nature and the analysis was statistically driven.  The 
aspects of measurement which were subjective and interpretive were the assessments of public 
policy in the sample countries to convert the policy position to a quantitative measurement, but a 
composite of each country’s policy regimes was created that smoothed interpretative differences 
for each country’s policy positions.  However, for most of these measurement scenarios, the 
modified Likert-style measurement was relatively easy to assess given the limited variable 
choices of ~20% intervals (0-4 values). 
Time dimension 
The time dimension for this study was a point-in-time measurement of the dependent 
variable of digital currency usage on or about May 31, 2018.  There was no longitudinal 
component nor repeat measurement of the variables.  Because the goal of the study was to 
measure the phenomena of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency use, as more time elapses, the nexus 
between the independent and dependent variables diminish.  Societal factors are less sensitive to 
time; this study used factors based on the most recent available, preferably 2018 or later.  In the 
case of WVS and EVS, the most recent wave concluded in 2014 and 2017, respectively. 
Type of experiment 
This study used secondary data that allows comparisons among metrics and it was a non-
experimental design because the independent variables of societal and public policy factors could 
not be experimentally altered.  The goal of non-experimental studies is to measure a relationship 
not to prove causation.  There was no control group for this study, nor was there a random 
assignment to groups. 
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Sample 
The population for this study was all countries with residents who may have interest, 
perceptions, or usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.  This is presumed to be at or close to the 
279 countries recognized by the United Nations.  The sample for one of the dependent variables 
for this research study was a convenience sample identical to the countries selected by ING/Ipsos 
based on their survey methodology, which numbered 15.  In the case of other dependent 
variables, there were 28 countries’ data sampled based on G7 and G20 membership, in addition 
to the overlapping sample in the ING/Ipsos survey data, as discussed below. 
Sampling technique 
The technique used to sample the population was a modified convenience sample 
strategy.  The base sample was G20 countries, which represent the most developed countries in 
the world; however, within this sample there was a considerable range of in-country metrics for 
the variables being measured, a goal of the research.  From the G20 countries, the major dataset 
from ING/Ipsos was selected because it was a survey of 15 of the G20 countries.  The research 
goal was to measure countries across a broad range of economic status, but in such a way that 
there was sufficient economic activity to have measurable cryptocurrency activity, thus the target 
demographic of the ING/Ipsos survey was ideal. 
However, by sampling only the G20 countries and not a random sample of all countries 
in the world, the data could be skewed towards developed countries’ use of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency; as noted in my hypotheses, the level of a country’s economic development is a 
societal characteristic that may lead to greater cryptocurrency usage and vice versa.  This caveat 
to the sampling method was considered during the analysis and interpretation of results.  With all 
of this in mind, the ING/Ipsos data was determined to be the best-case scenario of 15 countries 
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that would otherwise meet the research criteria.  However, these sampling methodologies 
essentially leave out the entire continent of Africa, an important emerging socio-economic region 
of the world, among other areas of the world. 
The convenience of using these 15 or 28 countries for which all variables were available 
and reliable justifies this initial approach.  This was non-probability sampling and was 
appropriate given the non-experimental, exploratory nature of this research.  Future research 
could build upon this work and study the next 20 countries beyond the G20 or these 15 in the 
ING/Ipsos dataset, like the continent of Africa or Asia-Pacific countries. 
Data collection 
The data collection technique for this research was a review and analysis of the metrics 
from the specified secondary data collection sources.  Data collection was completed during the 
months after the release of the ING/Ipsos data (fall, 2018) for all measurements. 
Limitations 
The most significant limitation of this research was the uniqueness of cryptocurrency and 
especially Bitcoin.  Cryptocurrencies have complex technical underpinnings and underdeveloped 
user interfaces.  They are not yet user-friendly.  This makes them less receptive to quick 
adoption, no matter how interested a user may be in the possibility.  Measuring perceptions of a 
complex new form of money was confounded by the difficulty the average person has with 
understanding the technology, much less the concept, of a new currency.  However, this is 
similar to the situation encountered in the latter decades of the 20th century with regard to the 
adoption of new networking technologies.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the development and 
use of basic telecommunications protocols and the internet were taking place and important to 
measure and understand, though the average person could not fully use or comprehend the 
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potential of such technologies at the time.  Those examples and other technology adoption curves 
are instructive for this research. 
Another potential concern was the quality of the data.  The respondents to the ING/Ipsos 
survey may not have been representative of the general populations of the countries under study.  
The data on Bitcoin and cryptocurrency usage may have provided imperfect measures of actual 
individual-level decisions to use them as a currency.  Because the ING/Ipsos survey section on 
cryptocurrencies terminated if the user had not heard of cryptocurrency, getting data from 
respondents about the topic of a “new money” was not possible if they did not already know 
about this particular “new money”, which potentially skewed the survey data towards people 
favorably disposed to Bitcoin and potentially masking perceptions from individuals that will 
never be interested in a new currency.  The fluidity of public policy and the difficulty in 
assessing a given policy’s impact also presented challenges.  However, these appear to be the 
best and only data available in a rapidly changing field of inquiry.  It is important to note, 
ING/Ipsos conducted a second survey of the same 15 countries in the fall of 2019, including 
cryptocurrency questions again, that could be used to test this initial research. 
To my knowledge, this research was the first of its kind, analyzing currency systems that 
are the first of their kind.  Concerns about validity are inevitable when dealing with emergent 
phenomena and new sources of data.  Furthermore, the novelty of cryptocurrency, early 
adopters’ bias toward anonymity, and the public’s hesitancy to discuss monetary (of any kind) 
issues make information about individual attitudes difficult to collect, particularly across 
multiple national contexts.  However, the uniqueness and potential value of the data sources 
analyzed in this study must, therefore, be emphasized even if they are not as rigorous and well-
studied as those used in other areas of social scientific inquiry.  Moreover, the results of this 
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research provide models for better ways of measuring cryptocurrency perceptions and use.  In 
particular, this research helped establish composites and indices for the measurement of the 
cryptocurrency phenomena that will make future analyses easier for others. 
Results and Analysis 
The data were collected as described above and initial analysis tests were done to 
determine a statistical methodology that had the greatest utility for analysis.  Given the 
uniqueness of the subject matter and the limited availability of research data on cryptocurrency, 
there were significant limitations to the ability to integrate the ING/Ipsos and WVS/EVS data 
into a single dataset.  As such, the ING/Ipsos data and the WVS/EVS datasets were treated as 
discrete sets and a methodology was determined to aggregate the measurements from each 
dataset in combination with per-country metrics (and triangulate between the datasets) to arrive 
at meaningful insights and rigorous analysis.  Thus, what was achieved was a meaningful 
analysis of the ING/Ipsos per-country data, the WVS/EVS per-country data, and then an analysis 
of between-country data to model usage and perceptions and the relationship between them both. 
In principle, this is no different than what researchers using cross-sectional WVS/EVS 
data have always done, but with the added challenge of the small sample size of countries from 
the ING/Ipsos data, which only covers 15 countries.  The limitations of this sample size were 
ever-present during the analysis of these data and the summarization of the findings (see 
Appendix D).  To ground this work in the established methodologies employed by other studies 
with small samples of countries, I reviewed dozens of other studies collected through Google 
Scholar searches that used the WVS dataset.  I identified 50 articles since the year 2016 that 
included WVS data from Wave 6 (concluded in 2014). 
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The most prolific authors within this group were Christian Welzel (a member of the WVS 
executive committee, a PI for Waves 5 and 6, and a frequent co-author with WVS founder 
Inglehart) and Arno Tausch (a political scientist based in Austria).  These two authors’ typical 
approach has been to collect cross-sectional/single-wave country averages of percentage 
responses to binary or Likert-style questions.  Their analysis is based on full and partial 
correlations and multivariate factor analysis – most often oblique Promax rotations – to form 
composites and indices on which to perform ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis of 
these reduced factors.26  Methodologically, one of the studies most closely related to my research 
was found in Tausch WVS research on Inter-Partner Violence (IPV) around the world (Tausch, 
2019) and that research, in particular, was modeled as a guide for this analysis. 
A second major thread among the literature for cross-sectional, cross-national 
comparisons of country means and between-country differences followed the work of Richard 
Florida and Gary Gates (2001) positing technology and tolerance indices for 50 metropolitan 
areas in the U.S. – giving rise the term “the creative class” – in the early 2000s.  Florida and 
Gate’s work was expanded on by Das, et al. (2008), who created a “global tolerance index” 
based on 62 countries and WVS data and then expanded again by Zanakis, et al. (2016), who 
developed a “global social tolerance index” – this time, across 56 countries, again using WVS 
data.  These latter two studies verified through extensive statistical methods the internal 
reliability of WVS instruments and data and, in particular, the trust questions used in the present 
research. 
 
26 For many of these types of studies, a multi-level model (MLM, or hierarchical linear regression) was performed, 
but that approach relies on the data being in a single dataset, a feature not available in the present research.  In the 
future research discussion below, a method is suggested that would make MLM feasible. 
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In summary, to analyze the available data on Bitcoin and cryptocurrency, a hybrid 
methodology based on recent cross-country research was adopted to utilize country-level means 
of the independent and dependent variables for between-country analysis to model Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency perceptions and usage.  Additionally, a multivariate PCA factor analysis of all 
independent and dependent variables was undertaken to explain reported perceptions and usage 
base on the rankings and patterns in the between-country analysis and an OLS regression 
performed on those factors, composites, and indices. 
Descriptives, composites, indices, and factors 
Dependent variable #1 – perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency 
The first dependent variable measurements were from questions asked on the ING/Ipsos 
survey of 15 countries regarding cryptocurrency awareness, perceptions, ownership, and use.  
Descriptive summaries for this survey instrument were as follows: 
ING/Ipsos Country Response Distribution 
  N Percent Cumulative Percent 
Austria 1009 6.8 6.8 
Belgium 1008 6.8 13.6 
France 1060 7.1 20.8 
Germany 1005 6.8 27.5 
Italy 1018 6.9 34.4 
Luxembourg 553 3.7 38.1 
Netherlands 1029 6.9 45.1 
Poland 1023 6.9 52.0 
Romania 1007 6.8 58.8 
Spain 1019 6.9 65.6 
Turkey 1021 6.9 72.5 
United Kingdom 1016 6.9 79.4 
Czech Rep. 1031 7.0 86.3 
USA 1008 6.8 93.1 
Australia 1021 6.9 100.0 
Total 14828 100.0   
 
Table 1. ING/Ipsos Country Response Distribution 
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ING/Ipsos Responses by Gender 
    Frequency Percent Valid Pct Cumulat. Pct 
Valid Man 7253 48.9 48.9 48.9 
  Woman 7575 51.1 51.1 100.0 
  Total 14828 100.0 100.0   
 
Table 2. ING/Ipsos Gender Frequency Distribution 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the full sample of approximately 15,000 respondents.  The numbers 
of respondents per country and by gender were evenly distributed.27  (Other demographic 
characteristics like education, income, and household size were reviewed and also well-
distributed but not formally considered in this research.) 
The two main sections of the instrument that were used for analysis relevant to 
cryptocurrency from the survey responses were 1) related to the respondents’ awareness, 
ownership, and expected ownership of cryptocurrency, and 2) their potential usage of 
cryptocurrency. 
Awareness, ownership, and expectation to own Bitcoin and cryptocurrency 
The perceptions and ownership questions asked the respondent whether they had heard of 
cryptocurrency and whether they owned it or expected to own it in the future.  The tables below 
summarize the descriptive results (frequencies are included in Appendix E).  The “Yes” 
responses per country were as follows: 
  
 
27 Luxembourg’s n=553 was intentional based on weighting of the N population of the country relative to the rest of 
the sampling from the other 14 countries.  For the fuller description of this methodology see 
https://think.ing.com/articles/where-is-cryptocurrency-headed-in-the-eyes-of-consumers-online-spending/ 
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I have: Heard of Crypto Own Crypto Expect to Own 
Country   Percent Percent Percent 
Austria Yes 79.3 8.3 19.0 
Belgium Yes 38.0 4.5 10.0 
France Yes 49.9 5.8 16.8 
Germany Yes 70.3 7.7 20.8 
Italy Yes 70.1 7.8 23.6 
Luxembourg Yes 67.3 4.0 11.9 
Netherlands Yes 54.5 7.3 13.5 
Poland Yes 77.2 11.4 29.4 
Romania Yes 74.7 12.5 38.3 
Spain Yes 66.8 10.0 32.0 
Turkey Yes 70.7 18.1 45.4 
United King. Yes 60.6 6.0 14.3 
Czech Republic Yes 69.3 8.9 18.6 
USA Yes 56.5 7.7 20.3 
Australia Yes 70.0 6.3 14.5 
 
Table 3. Per-country Percentages of Respondents who have Heard of, Own, or Expect to Own a 
Cryptocurrency 
 
Ranked by each question, the charts for the “Yes” responses were as follows: 
 
 
Chart 1. Per-country Percentages of Respondents Who Have Heard of Cryptocurrencies 
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Chart 2. Per-country Percentages of Respondents Who Own Cryptocurrency 
 
 
Chart 3. Per-country Percentages of Respondents Who Expect to Own Cryptocurrency 
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Because each country’s overall percentage of each of the preceding questions is 
considered more favorable towards cryptocurrency, an overall cumulative “Yes” to each question 
was tabulated and is graphed in Chart 4: 
 
 
Chart 4. Per-country Cumulative Percentages of Respondents Who Have Heard of, Own, or 
Expect to Own Cryptocurrency 
 
The favorability of cryptocurrency across the proceeding three charts combined with the 
cumulative results in the fourth chart suggest a trend of extremes, with Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands being less favorable to cryptocurrency, and Poland, Romain and Turkey 
being more favorable.  The descriptive statistics in Table 4 summarize the means, dispersion, and 
ranges of these variables: 
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Descriptives of % Yes, I have heard, own, expect to own 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Own Crypto 15.0 4.0 18.1 8.4 3.6 
Expect to Own 15.0 10.0 45.4 21.9 10.2 
Heard of Crypto 15.0 38.0 79.3 65.0 11.2 
Cumulat. % Yes 15.0 52.5 134.2 95.3 21.6 
 
Table 4. Descriptives of Per-country Respondents Who Having Heard of, Own, or Expect to 
Own Cryptocurrency 
 
Use of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency for common currency purposes 
The second relevant question from the ING/Ipsos data asked the respondent to consider 
whether they would use cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin for common currency purposes, e.g., 
buying a cup of coffee, receiving take-home pay, paying taxes.  Respondents were able to say 
“Yes” to a particular usage of cryptocurrency but could say “No” for more than one reason (i.e., 
don’t want to change, too risky, want to hold cryptocurrency for investment).  Because these 
questions involved a binary yes/no with 1-3 possible answers across seven dimensions, factor 
analysis was used to determine if a loading or pattern of answers emerged.  A principal 
component analysis (PCA) was performed with a Promax rotation.  Approximately 72% of the 
variance was explained by three components.  The results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and 
Bartlett’s Test are provided in Tables 5 and 6: 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.631 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 362915.503 
  df 378 
  Sig. 0.000 
 
Table 5. KMO and Bartlett’s for PCA of Cryptocurrency for Common Currency Purposes 
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Total Variance Explained 
  Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotated. Sums of Squ. Loadingsa 
Component Total % of Var. Cumlat. % Total % of Var. Cumlat. % Total 
1 8.043 28.723 28.723 8.043 28.723 28.723 7.553 
2 6.180 22.070 50.793 6.180 22.070 50.793 6.900 
3 5.823 20.797 71.591 5.823 20.797 71.591 6.691 
4 0.927 3.310 74.901         
5 0.673 2.405 77.305         
6 0.663 2.369 79.674         
7 0.563 2.011 81.685         
8 0.500 1.784 83.469         
9 0.439 1.568 85.037         
10 0.433 1.548 86.585         
11 0.412 1.470 88.055         
12 0.395 1.412 89.467         
13 0.373 1.331 90.798         
14 0.352 1.259 92.057         
15 0.343 1.224 93.281         
16 0.331 1.184 94.465         
17 0.298 1.066 95.530         
18 0.283 1.011 96.541         
19 0.251 0.895 97.436         
20 0.218 0.778 98.214         
21 0.196 0.702 98.916         
22 0.185 0.660 99.576         
23 0.028 0.099 99.675         
24 0.022 0.078 99.753         
25 0.019 0.069 99.822         
26 0.019 0.067 99.889         
27 0.016 0.057 99.946         
28 0.015 0.054 100.000         
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
Table 6. Total Variance for PCA of Cryptocurrency for Common Currency Purposes 
 
The PCA pattern matrix was set for an absolute value of 0.3 or greater and resulted in a 
clear pattern of the usage-type questions focused on a respondent’s interest in using Bitcoin for 
all transaction types.  There were also factor loadings on two other main expressions: Bitcoin 
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was deemed too risky, or Bitcoin was only seen as an investment (speculative).  A fourth loading 
was negatively correlated in all PCA components (though to a far less extent, while being above 
the threshold of greater than or equal to an absolute value (abs ≥) 0.3 loading): the tendency for 
respondents to be uninterested in changing their currency for the given type of transaction.  The 
factor loadings per component are reported in Table 7: 
 
Factor Analysis Pattern Matrix – Promax rotation 
 Component 
1 2 3 
Buy Coffee w BTC, yes   0.832   
Take-home pay w BTC, yes   0.785   
Pay taxes w BTC, yes   0.903   
Pay elec bill w BTC, yes   0.931   
Buy plane fare w BTC, yes   0.913   
Internat. payment to buy product online w BTC, yes   0.866   
Save for child's tuition w BTC, yes   0.817   
Buy Coffee w BTC, no, don't want to change -0.397 -0.437 -0.322 
Take-home pay w BTC, no, don’t want to change -0.395 -0.352 -0.395 
Pay taxes w BTC, no, don't want to change -0.388 -0.452 -0.361 
Pay elec bill w BTC, no, don't want to change -0.387 -0.472 -0.344 
Buy plane fare w BTC, no, don't want to change -0.365 -0.499 -0.334 
Internat. pymt to buy product online w BTC, no, don't want to change -0.342 -0.490 -0.322 
Save for child's tuition w BTC, no, don't want to change -0.365 -0.420 -0.367 
Buy Coffee w BTC, no, too risky     0.874 
Take-home pay w BTC, no, too risky     0.853 
Pay taxes w BTC, no, too risky     0.919 
Pay elec bill w BTC, no, too risky     0.933 
Buy plane fare w BTC, no, too risky     0.921 
Internat. payment to buy product online w BTC, no, too risky     0.893 
Save for child's tuition w BTC, no, too risky     0.839 
Buy coffee w BTC, no, BTC only an investment 0.951     
Take-home pay w BTC, no, BTC only an investment 0.928     
Pay taxes w BTC, no, BTC only an investment 0.970     
Pay elec bill w BTC, no, BTC only an investment 0.984     
Buy plane fare w BTC, no, BTC only an investment 0.973     
Internat. pymt to buy product online w BTC, no, BTC only an invest. 0.943     
Save for child's tuition w BTC, no, BTC only an investment 0.918     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Table 7. Factor Loadings per Component of PCA of Cryptocurrency for Common Currency 
Purposes 
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Because of the clear clustering of each type of cryptocurrency use or avoidance, and to 
make the responses to this question easier to analyze, a composite of the responses to each type 
was created for each case.  Given the nature of each response (“Yes, I would buy X with 
cryptocurrency”; “No, I don’t want to change the way I pay”; “No, cryptocurrency is too risky”; 
“No, cryptocurrency is only an investment for me”), these composites were labeled as 
corresponding to four typical personality types: Evangelist, Pragmatist, Skeptic, or Speculator.  
An evangelist is someone who believes in a broad structure and methodology and its 
applicability to a wide variety of circumstances, but the general population does not necessarily 
share that belief system.  Because a subset of the respondents chose Bitcoin for all currency uses, 
this seems like an applicable title for those individuals, especially since there is no broad 
agreement on the methodology and applicability of Bitcoin to any or all currency type uses.  A 
pragmatist is someone who tends to be less moved by novel reasoning to change opinion or 
behavior for no readily apparent benefit, so this is an apt title for individuals that indicated they 
did not want to change currencies for any currency use type; by contrast, skeptics are actively 
opposed to topics or ideas because of perceived deficiencies or lack of benefit so those 
individuals that chose Bitcoin as too risky for all currency type uses were given this name.  
Finally, individuals that were opposed to any currency use type for Bitcoin because they only see 
Bitcoin as an “investment” (this is generally considered a high risk/reward investment) were 
given the title of a speculator. 
The maximum value for each composite type of use was then 7 for “Yes” answers and 
potentially 21 for “No” answers.  Logically, the “No” responses would likely be clustered around 
“No, I don’t want to change the way I pay” and “No, too risky” versus “No, cryptocurrency is 
only an investment,” which means a total between 7 and 14 was more likely.  Of note, if the 
 85 
respondent had indicated they had not heard of cryptocurrency, the respondent did not receive 
this series of questions; these cases were recorded as missing values in the dataset (frequencies 
included in Appendix D).  A mean of each country’s personality types was calculated, as 
presented in Table 8: 
 
Usage Type Index Mean by Country 
Country - Mean Evangelist Pragmatist Skeptic Prospector 
Austria Mean 0.9 3.8 1.5 1.1 
Belgium Mean 0.8 3.7 1.6 1.1 
France Mean 1.1 3.4 1.4 1.3 
Germany Mean 1.0 3.6 1.5 1.1 
Italy Mean 2.0 2.9 1.2 1.0 
Luxembourg Mean 0.7 4.1 1.4 1.1 
Netherlands Mean 0.7 3.9 1.7 0.9 
Poland Mean 1.5 3.0 1.6 1.1 
Romania Mean 2.2 2.6 1.1 1.2 
Spain Mean 1.8 2.9 1.4 1.1 
Turkey Mean 2.6 2.7 0.7 1.1 
United Kingdom Mean 0.9 3.6 1.8 1.0 
Czech Republic Mean 1.2 3.4 1.1 1.4 
USA Mean 1.4 3.1 1.8 1.1 
Australia Mean 0.8 3.7 2.0 0.9 
 
Table 8. Usage Type Index Mean by Country 
 
Descriptive statistics relating to these personality types of cryptocurrency users are 
provided in Table 9: 
 
Descriptives of Perspective on Cryptocurrency Use by Country 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
prospector 15 0.88 1.45 1.10 0.14 
evangelist 15 0.65 2.65 1.31 0.60 
skeptic 15 0.67 1.97 1.45 0.33 
pragmatist 15 2.60 4.05 3.35 0.47 
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of Perspectives on Cryptocurrency Use 
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Measures of the Evangelist and Prospector personality perspective were higher when the 
respondent provided answers that were more favorable to cryptocurrency.  While these types 
could be closely related in many cases, for the purposed of this research, an evangelist supports 
the use of Bitcoin for all usage types while a speculator is only supportive of one type and not 
any other types (investment, pursuant to the question asked of them).  Interestingly, the 
Speculator type is essentially dependent on the Evangelist type to promote Bitcoin so it increases 
in use and then increases in value.28  The measure of the Skeptic perspective was higher when 
the respondent provided answers less favorable to cryptocurrency.  The Pragmatist personality 
type was a neutral category, offering answers that were in between the other categories. 
The following four charts provide a more detailed view of the relative position of each 
country’s personality perspectives.  As can be seen again, northern European countries tended to 
have more cryptocurrency skeptics, and southeastern European Romania and Turkey were 
situated at the extreme of having more individuals in the evangelist and prospector categories: 
  
 
28 However, this is a paradox that the cryptocurrency world is beginning to see and appreciate.  If users have to use 
the currency for it to become more popular to increase in value but people are hesitant to use it as it may rapidly and 
significantly increase in value, then there is a bit of a chicken-and-egg problem.  This harkens Cohen’s currency 
pyramid among permeate or plebian and higher-level currencies or the Chinese yuan/renminbi dichotomy. 
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Chart 5. Average Evangelist Perspective per Country 
 
 
Chart 6. Average Pragmatist Perspective per Country 
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Chart 7. Average Skeptic Perspective per Country 
 
 
Chart 8. Average Prospector Perspective per Country 
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Dependent variable #2 – usage of Bitcoin 
The second set of dependent variables focused on direct action by individuals to seek 
information about Bitcoin or attempt to use Bitcoin.  They included: 
1. Google Trends internet search interest rank of the term “bitcoin” for the trailing 5 
years from May 31, 2018. 
2. Number of Bitcoin Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) in-country on May 31, 
2018.  
3. Number of Bitcoin Mining Nodes in-country on May 31, 2018. 
These data (shown in Table 10) were collected for the full list of 28 countries based on 
the overall research methodology described above.  Because the ATM and nodes metrics were 
heavily dependent on user behavior, the population in millions in each country is included for a 
per capita measurement in addition to the raw measurement.  The summary descriptive statistics 
are provided in two lists: a list of all (n=28) countries in the sample and a list of the 15 
ING/Ipsos sample countries, corresponding to Tables 11 and 12, respectively. 
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Google Trends, ATMs, Bitcoin Nodes in All Sample Countries 
Country Google Trnd ATMs Nodes Population(M) ATMs/Cap(M) Nodes/Cap(M) 
Indonesia 14 1 3 267.671 0.0037 0.0112 
India  5 1 26 1352.642 0.0007 0.0192 
Mexico  17 11 8 126.191 0.0872 0.0634 
Saudi Arabia 10 2 3 33.703 0.0593 0.0890 
Venezuela  24 1 3 28.887 0.0346 0.1039 
Turkey* 11 25 13 82.34 0.3036 0.1579 
Brazil  29 0 38 209.469 0.0000 0.1814 
China  15 0 353 1427.648 0.0000 0.2473 
South Africa  9 6 20 57.793 0.1038 0.3461 
Argentina  23 11 21 44.361 0.2480 0.4734 
Italy* 13 54 70 60.627 0.8907 1.1546 
Spain* 19 94 59 46.693 2.0131 1.2636 
Poland* 10 48 50 37.922 1.2658 1.3185 
Japan  8 3 190 127.202 0.0236 1.4937 
Russia  12 59 248 145.734 0.4048 1.7017 
Romania* 9 38 41 19.506 1.9481 2.1019 
South Korea  8 1 144 51.172 0.0195 2.8140 
Belgium* 8 14 40 11.482 1.2193 3.4837 
United K.* 8 273 301 67.142 4.0660 4.4830 
Australia* 7 25 132 24.898 1.0041 5.3016 
Austria* 12 251 52 8.891 28.2308 5.8486 
USA* 6 3702 2363 327.096 11.3178 7.2242 
Czech Rep.* 8 69 82 10.666 6.4692 7.6880 
Canada  7 701 328 37.075 18.9076 8.8469 
France* 11 2 606 64.991 0.0308 9.3244 
Luxembourg* 9 0 10 0.604 0.0000 16.5563 
Germany* 14 36 1891 83.124 0.4331 22.7491 
Netherlands* 8 42 496 17.06 2.4619 29.0739 
 
Table 10. Usage of Bitcoin per Country 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Bitcoin Usage - All Sample Countries 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Google Trends 28 5 29 11.93 5.818 
ATMs 28 0 3702 195.36 701.683 
Nodes 28 3 2363 271.11 551.107 
Population (M) 28 0.604 1427.648 170.44964 353.437921 
ATMs/Pop(M) 28 0.0000 28.2308 2.912400 6.4486049 
Nodes/Pop(M) 28 0.0112 29.0739 4.790017 7.1702974 
 
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Bitcoin Usage - All Sample Countries 
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Descriptive Statistics for Bitcoin Usage – ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Google Trends 15 6 19 10.20 3.321 
ATMs 15 0 3702 311.53 941.553 
Nodes 15 10 2363 413.73 723.936 
Population (M) 15 0.604 327.096 57.53613 79.582593 
ATMs/Pop(M) 15 0.0000 28.2308 4.110282 7.3149357 
Nodes/Pop(M) 15 0.1579 29.0739 7.848619 8.5138858 
 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics for Bitcoin Usage - ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
 
Independent variable #1 – public policy 
The independent variable of public policy represented a collection of quantitative 
measurements of the public policy positions of major governmental institutions with regard to 
cryptocurrencies.  There were nine dimensions of public policy that ranged from recorded values 
of 0-1, 0-3, or 4 in several cases, and raw number count in others.  While collecting the data and 
during preliminary analysis, two considerations arose: the nuance of interpreting policy, which, 
in some cases, was quite clear and in others was vague, and the reality that the dimensions of 
currency use and regulation were actually best measured in aggregate with regard to any 
currency, and especially a new one.  To mitigate these interpretative challenges and to assist with 
the analysis of this variable, a composite was constructed of the sum of each dimension for a 
total count per country.  Possible values of this Public Policy Index were from 0-n.  The 
dimension metrics are listed below: 
• Bitcoin and cryptocurrency legality – a measure of the relative legality of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency in the sample country: 0-3 
• Bitcoin and cryptocurrency classification policy – a measure of which property of 
currency the sample country considers Bitcoin and cryptocurrency to be: 0-4 
 92 
• Cryptocurrency exchange – a measure of the regulatory environment for 
cryptocurrency exchanges: 0-3 
• Initial coin offering – a measure of whether ICOs are permitted to be offered in the 
country: 0-3 
• Cryptocurrency political support – a measure of the number of political entities 
openly supporting/accepting Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies: 0-n 
• Cryptocurrency payments – a measure of measures whether cryptocurrency payments 
are permitted in-country: 0 or 1 
• Fiat conversion – a measure of whether Bitcoin and cryptocurrency can be bought 
with the national currency: 0 or 1 
• Planned legislation or regulation – a measure of whether cryptocurrency public policy 
has been identified as a research topic for any formal body of the government: 0 or 1 
• Cryptocurrency warning – a measure of whether public policy arbiters have issued 
warnings about Bitcoin and cryptocurrency use: 0 or 1 
The statistics for the composite Public Policy Index and its constituent measures are 
listed in Table 11 for all (n=28) countries, with the 15 ING/Ipsos sample countries designated 
with an asterisk (a list of only ING/Ipsos sample countries is included in Appendix D).  
Descriptive analyses are included for all sample countries and ING/Ipsos sample countries in 
Tables 12 and 13, respectively.  Of note, the United States is ranked as having the highest policy 
favorability with regard to cryptocurrency, but only because of the outlier number of political 
organizations that reported a cryptocurrency position.  This is discussed further below. 
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State/Public Policy Dimensions and Composite of All Sample Countries 
Country Comp. Legality Class. Exch. ICO Politic. Pymnts Fiat Cv. Legis. Warn. 
India  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
China  3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Indonesia 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Argentina  7 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 
Romania*  8 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Saudi Ar. 8 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 
Belgium*  9 2 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 
Brazil  9 2 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 
Italy*  10 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 
Czech Rep.* 10 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 
S. Africa  10 2 0 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 
Australia*  11 2 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 
United K.* 11 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 
France*  11 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Poland*  12 1 3 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 
Spain*  14 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Austria*  14 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Turkey*  14 3 2 3 3 0 0 1 1 1 
Canada  15 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Japan  15 3 3 3 3 0 1 1 1 0 
Mexico  15 3 3 3 3 0 1 1 1 0 
Venezuela  15 3 3 3 3 0 0 1 1 1 
Netherld.*  16 3 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxemb.*  16 2 4 3 3 0 1 1 1 1 
Germany*  16 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 
S. Korea  16 3 4 3 3 0 1 1 1 0 
Russia  20 3 3 3 3 4 1 1 1 1 
USA*  21.5 2 2.5 2 2 9 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 13. State/Public Policy Dimensions and Composite of All Sample Countries 
 
Descriptive Statistics for ING/Ipsos and All Countries' Policy Composite 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Ipsos Sam. 15 8 21.5 12.73 3.127 
All Sample 28 2 21.5 11.75 4.616 
 
Table 14. Descriptive Statistics for ING/Ipsos and All Countries' Policy Composite 
  
 94 
Independent variable #2 – socio-economics and culture 
Societal factors as described above were collected in two groups: basic demographics per 
country and foreign exchange-monetary/gold per country. 
Basic demographic factors 
The basic demographic factors measured were GDP, Gini coefficient of inequality, HDI, 
Happiness Index, net migration, net migration rate, population, and population density.  The 
statistics are listed below for all (n=28) countries, with the 15 ING/Ipsos sample countries 
designated with an asterisk (a list of only ING/Ipsos sample countries is included in Appendix 
D).  Descriptive analyses are provided for all sample countries and ING/Ipsos sample countries 
in subsequent tables. 
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Basic Demographic Factors in All Sample Countries 
Country GDP(B) Gini HDI Happy N. Mig(K) N.Mig/K Pop Pop. (M) Pop./sq KM 
Luxemb.*  69.49 33.8 0.904 7.0903 49 16.3 0.604 250 
Romania*  239.55 35.9 0.811 6.0697 -370 -3.8 19.506 85 
Czech Rep.* 245.23 25.9 0.888 6.8521 110 2.1 10.666 138 
South Africa 368.29 63 0.699 4.7222 727 2.5 57.793 48 
Austria*  455.74 30.5 0.908 7.246 325 7.4 8.891 107 
Venezuela  482.36 46.9 0.761 4.7066 -3266 -22.3 28.887 33 
Argentina  518.48 41.2 0.825 6.0863 24 0.1 44.361 16 
Belgium*  531.77 27.7 0.916 6.923 240 4.2 11.482 377 
Poland*  585.78 31.8 0.865 6.1817 -147 -0.8 37.922 124 
Turkey*  766.51 41.9 0.791 5.3726 1420 3.5 82.340 107 
Saudi Arabia 782.48 - 0.853 6.3747 675 4.1 33.703 16 
Netherlnd.*  913.66 28.2 0.931 7.4876 80 0.9 17.060 511 
Indonesia 1042.17 38.1 0.694 5.1924 -495 -0.4 267.671 148 
Mexico  1223.81 48.3 0.774 6.5945 -300 -0.5 126.191 65 
Spain*  1426.19 36.2 0.891 6.3541 200 0.9 46.693 94 
Australia*  1432.20 35.8 0.939 7.228 791 6.4 24.898 3 
South Korea 1619.42 31.6 0.903 5.8947 59 0.2 51.172 530 
Russia  1657.55 37.7 0.816 5.6479 912 1.3 145.734 9 
Canada  1712.51 34 0.926 7.2781 1210 6.6 37.075 4 
Brazil  1868.63 53.3 0.759 6.2998 106 0.1 209.469 25 
Italy*  2073.90 35.4 0.88 6.2234 745 2.5 60.627 205 
India  2726.32 35.7 0.64 4.0152 -2663 -0.4 1352.642 455 
France*  2777.54 32.7 0.901 6.5921 183 0.6 64.991 122 
United K.*  2825.21 33.2 0.922 7.0537 1303 3.9 67.142 275 
Germany*  3996.76 31.7 0.936 6.985 2719 6.6 83.124 237 
Japan  4970.92 32.1 0.909 5.8861 358 0.6 127.202 347 
China  13608.15 38.6 0.752 5.1909 -1742 -0.2 1427.648 148 
USA*  20494.10 41.5 0.924 6.8923 4774 2.9 327.096 36 
 
Table 15. Basic Demographic Factors in All Sample Countries 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Basic Demographic Factors in All Sample Countries 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
GDP(B) 28 69487.92 20494100.00 2550525.036 4359963.558 
Gini 27 25.9 63.0 37.14 8.16 
HDI 28 0.640 0.939 0.8471 0.0842 
Happy 28 4.015 7.488 6.2300 0.8886 
Net Mig.(K) 28 -3266000 4774000 286678.6 1462434.2 
Net Mig. Rate (per 1/K Pop.) 28 -22.3 16.3 1.62 6.02 
Population (M) 28 604000 1427648000 170449642.9 353437921.1 
Population Dens.(Pop./sq KM) 28 3 530 161.3 156.6 
 
Table 16. Descriptive Statistics of Basic Demographic Factors in All Sample Countries 
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Descriptive Statistics of Basic Demographic Factors in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
GDP(B) 15 69487.92 20494100.00 2588907.271 5084336.225 
Gini 15 25.9 41.9 33.48 4.57 
HDI 15 0.791 0.939 0.8938 0.0433 
Happy 15 5.373 7.488 6.7034 0.5639 
Net Mig.(K) 15 -370000 4774000 828133.3 1341853.8 
Net Mig. Rate (per 1/K Pop.) 15 -3.8 16.3 3.57 4.59 
Population (M) 15 604000 327096000 57536133.3 79582592.7 
Population Dens.(Pop./sq KM) 15 3 511 178.1 134.6 
 
Table 17. Descriptive Statistics of Basic Demographic Factors in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
 
Foreign exchange-monetary/gold 
The foreign exchange-monetary/gold factors were foreign exchange (forex) in USD, 
forex in CNY, forex in EUR, gold reserves, forex reserves with and without gold, percentage of 
gold reserves in forex reserves.  The statistics are listed below for all (n=28) countries, with the 
15 ING/Ipsos sample countries designated with an asterisk (a list of only ING/Ipsos sample 
countries is included in Appendix D).  Descriptive analyses are provided for all sample countries 
and ING/Ipsos sample countries in subsequent tables. 
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Foreign Exchange-Monetary/Gold Factors in All Sample Countries 
Country ForExUSD ForExCNY ForExEUR Gold Rsvs(T) Rsvs-Gold(M) Rsv/Gold(M) Rsv Gold % 
Australia*  1.322 0.206 1.544 80.000 53259.014 56475.271 0.057 
Netherld.* 0.856 0.133 1.000 612.454 12215.851 36838.462 0.668 
Italy*  0.856 0.133 1.000 2451.837 49980.286 148552.009 0.664 
United K.* 0.749 0.117 0.874 310.287 142966.009 155440.551 0.080 
USA*  1.000 0.156 1.168 8133.462 114057.675 441049.007 0.741 
Luxembg.* 0.856 0.133 1.000 2.239 824.896 914.928 0.098 
Germany*  0.856 0.133 1.000 3369.880 59192.352 194672.357 0.696 
Spain*  0.856 0.133 1.000 281.578 57712.845 69033.168 0.164 
Austria*  0.856 0.133 1.000 279.991 12681.825 23938.376 0.470 
Turkey*  4.601 0.717 5.373 281.578 57712.845 69033.168 0.164 
Poland*  0.856 0.133 1.000 102.967 104814.664 108954.260 0.038 
Belgium*  0.856 0.133 1.000 227.396 17125.484 26267.524 0.348 
Romania*  0.856 0.133 1.000 103.698 36985.450 41154.451 0.101 
France*  0.856 0.133 1.000 2436.036 65715.578 163652.073 0.598 
Czech Rep.* 0.856 0.133 1.000 9.278 143809.982 144182.988 0.003 
Argentina  24.972 3.889 29.163 61.739 59268.251 61750.340 0.040 
Brazil  3.758 0.585 4.388 67.290 376783.114 379488.387 0.007 
Canada  1.295 0.202 1.512 0.000 81764.649 81764.649 0.000 
China  6.420 1.000 7.498 1842.555 3131516.990 3205593.648 0.023 
India  66.978 10.432 78.219 566.225 385400.078 408164.138 0.056 
Indonesia 13845.292 2156.438 16168.997 78.540 116681.859 119839.403 0.026 
Japan  109.498 17.055 127.875 765.215 1227775.484 1258539.605 0.024 
Mexico  19.866 3.094 23.200 120.242 173171.730 178005.844 0.027 
South Korea 1072.150 166.990 1252.092 104.399 395418.762 399615.942 0.011 
South Africa 12.646 1.970 14.768 125.315 45542.877 50580.940 0.100 
Russia  62.098 9.672 72.520 1944.014 378567.985 456723.611 0.171 
Saudi Arabia 3.750 0.584 4.379 323.067 506185.710 519174.061 0.025 
Venezuela  9.988 1.556 11.664 161.220 1931.001 8412.583 0.500 
 
Table 18. Foreign Exchange-Monetary/Gold Factors in All Sample Countries 
 
Descriptive Statistics Foreign Exchange-Monetary/Gold Factors in All Sample Countries 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ForExUSD 28 0.749 13845.292 544.850 2614.427 
ForExCNY 28 0.117 2156.438 84.862 407.203 
ForExEUR 28 0.874 16168.997 636.294 3053.216 
Gold Rsvs(T) 28 0.000 8133.462 887.232 1682.901 
Rsvs FX ex-Gold(M) 28 824.896 3131516.990 278895.116 612375.443 
Rsvs FX w-Gold(M) 28 914.928 3205593.648 314564.705 622178.660 
Resvs Gold % 28 0.000 0.741 0.211 0.255 
 
Table 19. Descriptive Statistics Foreign Exchange-Monetary/Gold Factors in All Sample 
Countries 
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Descriptive Statistics Foreign Exchange-Monetary/Gold Factors in ING/Ipsos Sample 
Countries 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ForExUSD 15 0.749 4.601 1.139 0.966 
ForExCNY 15 0.117 0.717 0.177 0.150 
ForExEUR 15 0.874 5.373 1.331 1.128 
Gold Rsvs(T) 15 2.239 8133.462 1245.512 2187.194 
Rsvs FX ex-Gold(M) 15 824.896 143809.982 61936.984 45797.160 
Rsvs FX w-Gold(M) 15 914.928 441049.007 112010.573 109195.924 
Resvs Gold % 15 0.003 0.741 0.326 0.282 
 
Table 20. Descriptive Statistics Foreign Exchange-Monetary/Gold Factors in ING/Ipsos Sample 
Countries 
 
Independent variable #3 – trust in society and government 
The trust factors for this research were based on two dimensions, trust in society (of three 
parts: generalized, in-group, and out-group) and general trust in governance and democracy.  
These data were drawn from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study in three 
simple questions and one six-part question.  The exact verbiage of each question used is listed in 
Appendix B and C.  The last metric used for this independent variable is the Democracy Index 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  The statistics are listed below for all (n=28) countries 
with the 15 ING/Ipsos sample countries designated with an asterisk (a list of only ING/Ipsos 
sample countries is included in Appendix D).  Descriptive analyses are provided for all sample 
countries and ING/Ipsos sample countries in subsequent tables. 
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Trust Factors of Society and Government in All Sample Countries 
Country 
Most 
Ppl 
Truste
d 
Trust in 
Family 
Trust in 
Neighbo
r 
People 
Known 
Person. 
People 
Met for 
1st Time 
People 
of 
Another 
Religion 
People 
of 
Another 
Nation. 
How 
Imp. 
Live In 
Dem. 
How 
Dem. is 
Country 
EIU 
Dem. 
Index 
Brazil 7.10 3.61 2.45 2.54 1.62 2.48 1.96 8.07 5.57 6.97 
Romania* 7.70 3.77 2.38 2.57 1.62 1.97 1.96 8.57 5.04 6.38 
Turkey* 11.60 3.93 3.22 3.08 1.94 2.16 2.17 8.57 6.41 4.37 
Mexico 12.40 3.74 2.43 2.52 1.56 1.94 1.79 8.54 6.19 6.19 
India 16.70 3.90 3.19 3.06 2.02 2.52 2.04 7.77 6.60 7.23 
Argentina 19.20 3.91 2.89 3.06 2.06 2.56 2.54 8.50 6.47 7.02 
Spain* 19.90 3.92 3.05 3.26 2.23 2.45 2.45 8.64 6.64 8.08 
Czch Rp.* 21.70 3.83 2.99 3.22 2.30 2.42 2.32 8.16 5.80 7.69 
Poland* 22.20 3.67 2.81 2.96 2.07 2.54 2.55 8.70 5.89 6.67 
S. Africa 23.30 3.71 2.91 2.75 2.26 2.55 2.42 7.55 6.72 7.24 
S. Korea 26.50 3.80 2.79 2.94 1.91 2.29 2.13 8.31 5.87 8.00 
France* 27.70 3.64 2.91 3.30 2.18 2.73 2.78 8.74 6.47 7.80 
Russia 27.80 3.86 2.86 3.01 1.89 2.26 2.26 7.42 4.56 2.94 
Italy* 27.90 3.84 2.87 2.81 2.09 2.51 2.53 9.20 6.04 7.71 
USA* 34.80 3.65 2.76 3.21 2.20 2.71 2.66 8.41 6.46 7.96 
Japan 35.90 3.73 2.60 2.95 1.83 1.82 2.01 8.27 6.72 7.99 
Untd K.* 41.20 3.85 3.05 3.53 2.49 2.93 2.94 8.83 6.62 8.53 
Germ.* 44.60 3.71 2.83 3.06 2.15 2.52 2.51 8.94 7.23 8.68 
Austria* 47.00 3.83 3.11 3.31 2.31 2.52 2.58 9.11 7.42 8.29 
Australia* 51.40 3.81 2.79 3.36 2.33 2.64 2.70 8.83 6.79 9.09 
China 60.30 3.89 3.04 2.92 1.92 1.95 1.91 8.43 6.43 3.32 
Nethrld.* 66.10 3.53 2.84 3.08 2.11 2.39 2.35 8.87 7.29 8.89 
Luxemb.* - - - - - - - - - 8.81 
Belgium* - - - - - - - - - 7.78 
Canada - - - - - - - - - 9.15 
Indonesia - - - - - - - - - 6.39 
Saudi A. - - - - - - - - - 1.93 
Venez.  - - - - - - - - - 3.16 
 
Table 21. Trust Factors of Society and Government in All Sample Countries 
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Trust Factors of Society and Governance in All Sample Countries 
  N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Most People Can Be Trusted 22 7.1 66.1 29.68 16.373 
Trust in Family 22 3.5 3.9 3.78 0.112 
Trust in Neighbors 22 2.4 3.2 2.85 0.229 
Trust in People Known Personally 22 2.5 3.5 3.02 0.270 
Trust in People Met for 1st Time 22 1.6 2.5 2.05 0.246 
Trust in People of Another Religion 22 1.8 2.9 2.40 0.285 
Trust in People of Another Nationality 22 1.8 2.9 2.34 0.313 
How Important to Live in a Democracy 22 7.4 9.2 8.47 0.465 
How Democratic is Your Country Today 22 4.6 7.4 6.33 0.687 
EIU Democracy Index 28 1.9 9.2 6.94 1.999 
 
Table 22. Trust Factors of Society and Governance in All Sample Countries 
 
Trust Factors of Society and Governance in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
  N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Most People Can Be Trusted 13 7.7 66.1 32.60 16.836 
Trust in Family 13 3.5 3.9 3.77 0.120 
Trust in Neighbors 13 2.4 3.2 2.89 0.207 
Trust in People Known Personally 13 2.6 3.5 3.14 0.254 
Trust in People Met for 1st Time 13 1.6 2.5 2.16 0.212 
Trust in People of Another Religion 13 2.0 2.9 2.50 0.245 
Trust in People of Another Nationality 13 2.0 2.9 2.50 0.257 
How Important to Live in a Democracy 13 8.2 9.2 8.74 0.280 
How Democratic is Your Country Today 13 5.0 7.4 6.47 0.666 
EIU Democracy Index 15 4.4 9.1 7.78 1.213 
 
Table 23. Trust Factors of Society and Governance in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
 
To better visualize these data, the following charts depict the spectrum of trust among the 
full sample of counties and the ING/Ipsos sample of countries.  These continue to show contrasts 
between northern European countries and southeastern European countries, with the respondents 
from northern European countries expressing greater levels of trust, the southeastern countries 
expressing less.  In light of the favorability of cryptocurrency in these low-trust countries, this 
suggests that trust is a large determinant of cryptocurrency perceptions and usage. 
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Chart 9. Most People Can be Trusted among All Sample Countries 
 
While the generalized trust question chart above shows a stark range of trust among the 
sample countries, when trust is viewed in aggregate among in-group and out-group 
constituencies, there is a somewhat tighter range and pattern.  In-group trust questions are those 
which measure how much trust individuals place in family and friends and acquaintances versus 
out-group constituencies like people of another religion or nation.  Chart 10 depicts this 
aggregated trust and the range among all sample countries.  This suggests there is a similar 
amount of trust that individuals in any culture have for specific types of groups; thus, there is 
only a difference among in-group and out-group, i.e., people either assign their total amount of 
trust among both in- and out-group evenly or reserve more of their trust for one or the other (in 
most cases it is reserved for in-group trust).  This is discussed further below as it relates to 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrency. 
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Chart 10. Aggregate Trust in Society among All Sample Countries 
 
Finally, the metrics of democracy from the Economist Intelligence Unit and the 
WVS/EVS survey are depicted in Charts 11 and 12.  They show a similar range and pattern when 
compared to the statistics regarding generalized trust: northern European and related countries 
have high democracy indices and perceptions, while southeastern European and other similar 
regions of the world have much lower democracy indices and perceptions.  For the two 
WVS/EVS democracy perceptions questions, an aggregate was graphed to easily show an overall 
sense of democracy in the country by combining individual perceptions of democracy and 
individual beliefs in whether their own countries are democratic. 
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Chart 11. EIU Democracy Index for All Sample Countries 
 
 
Chart 12. WVS/EVS Aggregate Democratic Outlook for All Sample Countries 
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Statistical analysis 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
The following hypotheses were tested with OLS regression testing: 
Control: public policy 
H1a: Countries with more restrictive policies regarding the use of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies will have more negative perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
H1b: Countries with more restrictive policies regarding the use of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies will have lower usage of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
Correlation analysis and basic scatterplot graphs were performed on the policy composite 
and the perception and usage metrics (ING/Ipsos metrics) to begin to analyze the data related to 
these two hypotheses to test for basic OLS analysis assumptions.  There was no large (>0.5 
absolute value) statistically significant correlation nor any scatterplot linear relationships 
between per-country policy and per-country metrics for any perception and usage metric.  A 
correlation analysis was run for all other dependent variables (ATMs, Google search interest, 
nodes) to determine if the policy composite was related to any other usage type.  Among all of 
these there was no measured large correlation with those measures as well.  Numerous OLS 
regression runs were performed on all the dependent variables of perception and usage with 
public policy as the predictor, and no statistically significant relationship was detected. 
As has been discussed above, the small sample size for the ING/Ipsos data (n=15) and the 
full sample of countries (n=28) exposes this research to the possibility of Type II error, so the 
lack of any detected relationship may be due to low statistical power.  However, it was striking 
how little to no correlation was observed across so many metrics, even though there were 
detectable and strong statistical results for other metrics (for instance, those discussed below).  In 
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any case, at the time of measurement in May 2018, this analysis found no evidence of any 
relationship between policy and perceptions and usage.  Table 24 depicts the correlation analysis 
calculated for public policy about the dependent variables that shows some of the strongest – but 
not statistically significant – relationships. 
Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Public Policy 
 policy heard own expect evangel pragmat skeptic prospct ATM interest nodes 
Pears. 1.000 -0.020 -0.038 -0.076 -0.257 0.198 0.250 -0.305 .429* -0.112 .454* 
Signif.  0.944 0.892 0.788 0.376 0.479 0.369 0.269 0.023 0.570 0.015 
N 28 15 15 15 14 15 15 15 28 28 28 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 24. Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Public Policy 
 
The lack of any relationship between overall governmental policy and user perceptions 
and usage is a curious result and unexpected.  Over the course of this research and analysis, it has 
sometimes been considered that policy could be as much of a dependent variable as it is an 
independent variable because of the complex interplay between citizenry and policy (in varying 
degrees of democratic and autocratic regimes) about any topic, not the least of which is a rapidly 
emerging and changing topic like cryptocurrency.  What these data suggest is that state policy 
does not change public opinion or behavior, and public opinion and behavior do not change state 
policy; the analysis provides no evidence that they are related, at least with this current 
arrangement of national policies as measured in May 2018.  However, it may be that public 
policy is a lagging indicator to citizen sentiments, at least in heavily democratic regimes, or 
behavior in less democratic, more autocratic, regimes. 
Of note, ATMs and nodes were by far the most correlated to policy (>0.04 Pearson 
correlation at 0.05 significance).  This makes intuitive sense because these are both physical 
presences that would require permission from local, state/provincial, and national authorities to 
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operate.  However, there was not a strong correlation between these measures.  This might be 
due to deficiencies in the policy composite itself, though my review of the policy authority 
documents to measure this variable found no references to ATMs or nodes – specifically – in any 
public policy.  The policies were silent on these practices. 
Cultural: socio-economic development 
H2a: Countries with more developed economies will have more positive perceptions of 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
H2b: Countries with more developed economies will have higher usage of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies. 
For this research, numerous measurements for economic development were included, but 
a PCA analysis identified only seven key variables: HDI, happiness, GDP, Gini coefficient for 
inequality, population, gold tonnes on reserve, and gold as a percentage of all foreign-exchange 
reserves.  Correlation analysis for each of these seven metrics for all cryptocurrency perception 
and usage variables revealed a significant negative correlation between the HDI and happiness 
variables in relation to cryptocurrency perceptions and usage, namely Bitcoin evangelism and 
prospecting.  Those same two variables were significant and positive for skepticism and 
pragmatism with respect to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.  This mirrored direction of correlation 
for the same variables with respect to the two personality types that are favorable and the 
personality types that are unfavorable to Bitcoin makes sense and confirms that the personality 
types are characterizing the perceptions and usage accurately, and oppositionally. 
Interestingly, there is no large correlation between having heard of cryptocurrency or 
having search interest in cryptocurrency and any country-level economic development metric, 
nor is there any large correlation between the perception and use of Bitcoin as a speculative 
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investment and any such economic development metric.  Of note, GDP and tonnes of gold 
reserves (but, notably, not gold as a percentage of all foreign exchange reserves) are only 
correlated with the numbers of ATMs and Bitcoin mining nodes. 
In summary, this correlation analysis suggests economic development factors of HDI, 
happiness, and the Gini coefficient for inequality are negatively correlated with the favorability 
of perceptions of cryptocurrency. Table 24 shows the correlation analysis of these metrics and 
Table 25 shows an analysis of the interrelated correlation between the economic development 
metrics.  Pearson correlations of greater than an absolute value of 0.5 are highlighted in yellow. 
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Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Happiness 
  happiness heard own expect evangelist pragmatist skeptic prospector ATM interest nodes 
happiness 
Pearson 
Corr. 
1 -
0.288 
-
.810** 
-.890** -.945** .891** .754** -0.281 0.223 -0.190 0.300 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  0.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.311 0.253 0.333 0.121 
N 28 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 28 28 28 
Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to GDP 
  GDP heard own expect evangelist pragmatist skeptic prospector ATM interest nodes 
GDP 
Pearson 
Corr. 
1 -
0.239 
-
0.107 
-0.077 0.001 -0.147 0.328 -0.119 .783** -0.136 .729** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  0.391 0.705 0.786 0.997 0.601 0.233 0.674 0.000 0.490 0.000 
N 28 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 28 28 28 
Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Gini 
  Gini heard own expect evangelist pragmatist skeptic prospector ATM interest nodes 
Gini 
Pearson 
Corr. 
1 0.210 0.470 .579* .622* -.590* -0.192 -0.297 0.064 .485* -
0.096 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  0.453 0.077 0.024 0.013 0.021 0.494 0.282 0.752 0.010 0.634 
N 27 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 27 27 27 
Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Population 
  population heard own expect evangelist pragmatist skeptic prospector ATM interest nodes 
population 
Pearson 
Corr. 
1 -
0.185 
0.071 0.100 0.181 -0.300 0.184 -0.104 0.053 -0.048 0.067 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  0.509 0.801 0.724 0.519 0.277 0.511 0.712 0.788 0.808 0.736 
N 28 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 28 28 28 
Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Reserve Tonnes of Gold 
  
resvs 
tonnes heard own expect evangelist pragmatist skeptic prospector ATM interest nodes 
resvs 
tonnes 
Pearson 
Corr. 
1 -
0.237 
-
0.136 
-0.079 0.031 -0.146 0.232 -0.071 .811** -0.161 .890** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  0.396 0.628 0.780 0.913 0.605 0.406 0.800 0.000 0.413 0.000 
N 28 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 28 28 28 
Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Reserve Gold % 
  
resvs gold 
% heard own expect evangelist pragmatist skeptic prospector ATM interest nodes 
resvs gold 
% of total 
Pearson 
Corr. 
1 -
0.345 
-
0.254 
-0.237 -0.143 0.148 0.185 -0.218 .386* -0.025 .621** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  0.208 0.361 0.395 0.612 0.600 0.510 0.435 0.043 0.900 0.000 
N 28 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 28 28 28 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 25. Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Cultural Metrics 
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Pearson Correlations of Economic Development Metrics 
  GDP Gini HDI happiness population resvs tonnes resvs gld % 
GDP Pearson Co 1 0.061 0.078 -0.004 .496** .837** 0.299 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.763 0.692 0.986 0.007 0.000 0.123 
N 28 27 28 28 28 28 28 
Gini Pearson Co 0.061 1 -.635** -.490** 0.081 -0.006 -0.169 
Sig. (2-tld) 0.763   0.000 0.009 0.688 0.975 0.398 
N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
HDI Pearson Co 0.078 -.635** 1 .862** -.549** 0.232 0.365 
Sig. (2-tld) 0.692 0.000   0.000 0.002 0.234 0.056 
N 28 27 28 28 28 28 28 
happiness Pearson Co -0.004 -.490** .862** 1 -.540** 0.126 0.272 
Sig. (2-tld) 0.986 0.009 0.000   0.003 0.522 0.161 
N 28 27 28 28 28 28 28 
population Pearson Co .496** 0.081 -.549** -.540** 1 0.184 -0.166 
Sig. (2-tld) 0.007 0.688 0.002 0.003   0.349 0.399 
N 28 27 28 28 28 28 28 
resvs 
tonnes 
Pearson Co .837** -0.006 0.232 0.126 0.184 1 .648** 
Sig. (2-tld) 0.000 0.975 0.234 0.522 0.349   0.000 
N 28 27 28 28 28 28 28 
resvs gold 
% of total 
Pearson Co 0.299 -0.169 0.365 0.272 -0.166 .648** 1 
Sig. (2-tld) 0.123 0.398 0.056 0.161 0.399 0.000   
N 28 27 28 28 28 28 28 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 26. Pearson Correlations of Economic Development Metrics 
 
Because of the strong mutual correlations among the economic development independent 
variable metrics (HDI, Happiness, and Gini) and the overlapping correlations of the perception 
and usage dependent variable metrics, the following three pairs of independent/dependent 
variables were isolated as the most relevant and regressed with an OLS model: HDI/Skeptic, 
Happiness/Evangelist, and Gini/Evangelist.  The results of these regressions are provided in 
Tables 27, 28, and 29: 
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HDI/Skeptic Regression Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .837a 0.700 0.677 0.18804 0.700 30.344 1 13 0.000 1.961 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HDI 
b. Dependent Variable: skeptic 
HDI/Skeptic Regression Model Coefficientsa   
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B   
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound   
1 (Constant) -4.260 1.038   -4.102 0.001 -6.503 -2.016   
HDI 6.393 1.161 0.837 5.509 0.000 3.886 8.900   
a. Dependent Variable: skeptic   
 
Table 27. HDI/Skeptic Regression Model 
 
 
 
Chart 13. HDI/Skeptic Regression Model Scatterplot 
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Happiness/Evangelist Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .945a 0.894 0.886 0.20172 0.894 109.363 1 13 0.000 2.500 
a. Predictors: (Constant), happiness 
b. Dependent Variable: evangelist 
Happiness/Evangelist Coefficientsa   
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B   
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound   
1 (Constant) 8.016 0.643   12.466 0.000 6.626 9.405   
happiness -1.000 0.096 -0.945 -10.458 0.000 -1.206 -0.793   
a. Dependent Variable: evangelist   
 
Table 28. Happiness/Evangelist Regression Model 
 
 
Chart 14. Happiness/Evangelist Regression Model Scatterplot 
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Gini/Evangelist Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .622a 0.387 0.340 0.48438 0.387 8.222 1 13 0.013 2.010 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gini 
b. Dependent Variable: evangelist 
Gini/Evangelist Coefficientsa   
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B   
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound   
1 (Constant) -1.408 0.957   -1.471 0.165 -3.476 0.660   
Gini 0.081 0.028 0.622 2.867 0.013 0.020 0.143   
a. Dependent Variable: evangelist   
 
Table 29. Gini/Evangelist Regression Model 
 
 
Chart 15. Gini/Evangelist Regression Model Scatterplot 
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Trust: attitudes of trust in society and of government 
H3a: Countries with lower levels of trust in government will have more positive 
perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. 
H3b: Countries with lower levels of trust in government will have higher usage of Bitcoin 
and cryptocurrencies. 
For this research, there were several measurements for trust, but a PCA analysis yielded 
only eight significant components: generalized trust, in-group trust, out-group trust, desire to live 
in a democracy, belief in current democratic governance, confidence in current government, and 
the EIUDI democracy index.  A correlation analysis between each of these eight metrics and all 
cryptocurrency perception and usage variables revealed a significant and large negative 
correlation between two trust variables – generalized trust and out-group trust – and 
cryptocurrency perceptions and usage.  Those same metrics are significant, large, and positive 
for skepticism and pragmatism with respect to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.  The Economist 
Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (EIUDI) democracy measurement is also significant and 
strongly negative in its correlation with favorable cryptocurrency perceptions and usage. 
Table 30 shows the correlation analysis of these metrics and Table 31 shows an analysis 
of the interrelated correlation between the actual independent variables of trust metrics.  Pearson 
correlations of greater than an absolute value of 0.5 are highlighted in yellow. 
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Pearson Correlations of Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Generalized Trust 
  gen trst heard own exp. evang. pragmat. skeptic prospect ATM interst nodes 
gen 
trust 
Pearson 
Co 
1 -
0.305 
-.669* -
.799** 
-.848** .901** .735** -.601* 0.094 -0.317 0.339 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.310 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.030 0.676 0.151 0.123 
N 22 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 22 22 22 
Pearson Correlations of Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to In-group Trust 
  in-grp heard own Exp evang. pragmat. skeptic prospect ATM interst nodes 
in-
group 
Pearson 
Co 
1 -
0.081 
-
0.094 
-
0.205 
-0.200 0.321 0.037 -0.045 0.029 -0.311 0.016 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.792 0.761 0.502 0.513 0.285 0.903 0.883 0.897 0.159 0.945 
N 22 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 22 22 22 
Pearson Correlations of Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Out-group Trust 
  out-grp heard own exp. evang. pragmat. skeptic prospect ATM interst nodes 
out-
group 
Pearson 
Co 
1 -
0.387 
-
.739** 
-
.751** 
-.661* .569* .685** -0.260 0.266 -0.236 0.295 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.191 0.004 0.003 0.014 0.042 0.010 0.391 0.232 0.290 0.182 
N 22 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 22 22 22 
Pearson Correlations of Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Importance of Living in a Democracy 
  livedem heard own exp. evang. pragmat. skeptic prospect ATM interst nodes 
livede
m 
Pearson 
Co 
1 0.150 -
0.323 
-
0.257 
-0.220 0.339 0.276 -.634* 0.006 0.024 0.157 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.625 0.282 0.397 0.470 0.258 0.361 0.020 0.980 0.916 0.484 
N 22 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 22 22 22 
Pearson Correlations of Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Belief in Current Country as a Democracy 
  govdem heard own exp. evang. pragmat. skeptic prospect ATM interst nodes 
govde
m 
Pearson 
Co 
1 -
0.224 
-
0.391 
-
0.505 
-.612* .755** 0.452 -0.504 0.065 -0.146 0.257 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.463 0.187 0.079 0.026 0.003 0.121 0.079 0.774 0.515 0.249 
N 22 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 22 22 22 
Pearson Correlations of Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Confidence in Current Government 
  con gov heard own exp. evang. pragmat. skeptic prospect ATM interst nodes 
confid 
in govt 
Pearson 
Co 
1 -
0.037 
0.314 0.137 0.065 0.188 -0.153 -0.335 -
0.033 
-0.023 0.089 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.905 0.295 0.656 0.833 0.539 0.617 0.263 0.882 0.921 0.693 
N 22 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 22 22 22 
Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to EIU Democracy Index 
  EIUDI heard own exp. evang. pragmat. skeptic prospect ATM interst nodes 
EIUDI Pearson 
Co 
1 -
0.225 
-
.876** 
-
.844** 
-.850** .764** .772** -0.351 0.163 -0.315 0.235 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.199 0.407 0.102 0.228 
N 28 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 28 28 28 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 30. Pearson Correlations of Cryptocurrency Perceptions and Usage to Trust Metrics 
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Pearson Correlations of Trust Metrics 
  gen trust in-grp out-grp livedem govdem live gov dem con. govt EIUDI 
gen 
trust 
Pearson Corr. 1 0.330 0.323 0.376 .572** .572** 0.347 0.239 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.134 0.143 0.084 0.005 0.005 0.114 0.284 
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
in-
group 
Pearson Corr. 0.330 1 .624** 0.160 0.397 0.350 0.211 0.086 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.134   0.002 0.478 0.067 0.110 0.346 0.702 
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
out-
group 
Pearson Corr. 0.323 .624** 1 0.324 0.409 .433* -0.282 .542** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.143 0.002   0.142 0.059 0.044 0.203 0.009 
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
livedem Pearson Corr. 0.376 0.160 0.324 1 .476* .793** -0.246 .464* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.084 0.478 0.142   0.025 0.000 0.270 0.030 
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
govdem Pearson Corr. .572** 0.397 0.409 .476* 1 .913** 0.179 .579** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 0.067 0.059 0.025   0.000 0.425 0.005 
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
confid 
in govt 
Pearson Corr. 0.347 0.211 -0.282 -0.246 0.179 0.011 1 -.545** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.114 0.346 0.203 0.270 0.425 0.961   0.009 
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
EIUDI Pearson Corr. 0.239 0.086 .542** .464* .579** .614** -.545** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.284 0.702 0.009 0.030 0.005 0.002 0.009   
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 28 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 31. Pearson Correlations of Trust Metrics 
 
Because of the strong mutual correlations among the trust independent variable metrics 
and the overlapping correlations of the perception and usage dependent variable metrics, the 
following three pairs of IV/DV were isolated as the most relevant and regressed with an OLS 
model: Generalized Trust/Evangelist, Out-group Trust/Evangelist, and EIUDI/Evangelist.  The 
results of these regressions are provided in Tables 32, 33, and 34: 
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Generalized Trust/Evangelist Regression Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Sq Chg F Chg df1 df2 Sig F Chg 
1 .848a 0.719 0.694 0.33117 0.719 28.208 1 11 0.000 1.711 
a. Predictors: (Constant), gen trust 
b. Dependent Variable: evangelist 
Generalized Trust/Evangelist Regression Model Coefficientsa     
Model 
Unstnd Coeff. Stnd Coeff 
t Sig. 
    
B Std. Err. Beta     
1 (Constant) 2.379 0.207   11.514 0.000     
gen trust -0.030 0.006 -0.848 -5.311 0.000     
a. Dependent Variable: evangelist     
 
Table 32. Generalized Trust/Evangelist Regression Model 
 
 
Chart 16. Generalized Trust/Evangelist Regression Model Scatterplot 
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Out-group Trust\Evangelist Regression Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Sq Chg F Chg df1 df2 Sig F Chg 
1 .661a 0.437 0.385 0.46933 0.437 8.522 1 11 0.014 2.169 
a. Predictors: (Constant), out-group 
b. Dependent Variable: evangelist 
Out-group Trust\Evangelist Regression Model Coefficientsa     
Model 
Unstnd Coeff Stnd Coeff 
t Sig. 
    
B Std. Err Beta     
1 (Constant) 5.516 1.417   3.892 0.003     
out-group -0.576 0.197 -0.661 -2.919 0.014     
a. Dependent Variable: evangelist     
 
Table 33. Out-group Trust\Evangelist Regression Model 
 
 
Chart 17. Out-group Trust\Evangelist Regression Model Scatterplot 
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EIUDI/Evangelist Regression Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Err. of 
the Est 
Change Statistics Durbin-
Watson R Sq Chg F Chg df1 df2 Sig F Chg 
1 .850a 0.722 0.700 0.32648 0.722 33.713 1 13 0.000 1.675 
a. Predictors: (Constant), EIUDI 
b. Dependent Variable: evangelist 
EIUDI/Evangelist Regression Model Coefficientsa     
Model 
Unstd Coeff Std Coeff 
t Sig. 
    
B Std. Err. Beta     
1 (Constant) 4.564 0.566   8.062 0.000     
EIUDI -0.418 0.072 -0.850 -5.806 0.000     
a. Dependent Variable: evangelist 
    
 
Table 34. EIUDI/Evangelist Regression Model 
 
 
Chart 18. EIUDI/Evangelist Regression Model Scatterplot 
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Resultant conceptual process model 
The variable model in Figure 8 below is based on the initial conceptual model (Figure 7) 
used to guide the methodology, which it is now possible to revisit with deeper consideration 
following the analysis above. 
 
 
Figure 8. Resultant Conceptual Process Model of Variables 
 
First, there were only three large, significant (>0.5 Pearson/<0.01 significance) 
correlations to Google search activity (DV1, Bitcoin Interest) among any of the collected IVs, 
which were numerous and widely covered the public policy, economic development, and trust 
spectrums.  The three IVs highly correlated to Google search interest were Online Readiness 
(UN-generated index of internet e-commerce preparedness) and two crime-related metrics 
(OECD Better Life Index components of homicide rate and “feel safe at night”).  These three IVs 
were not generally correlated with other DVs, so the full nature of their relationship to Google 
search interest may not extend beyond the noted correlation but is presented here as part of the 
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exploration of this field.  There were a series of other IVs that were slightly less significantly 
(>0.4 Pearson/<0.05 significance) correlated to Google search interest than the three discussed 
above and they were: higher Gini coefficient of inequality, lower net migration (lower 
immigration), lower density, lower in-group trust, lower confidence in the armed forces, police, 
and courts.  Table 35 depicts all the significant IV correlations to Google search interest. 
Strong and Statistically Significant Pearson Correlations  
Between Selected Independent Variables and Google Search Interest in Bitcoin 
  Int. Gini 
Online 
Readi. 
Crime 
Homi. 
Crime 
Feel Sfe 
Net 
Mig. Rt Dens. 
Confid. 
arm frc 
Confid. 
police 
Confid. 
courts 
Int. Pearson Co 1 .485* -.536** .756** -.618** -.451* -.410* -.473* -.448* -.431* 
Sig. (2-tld)   0.010 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.016 0.030 0.026 0.036 0.045 
N 28 27 28 20 20 28 28 22 22 22 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 35. Pearson Correlations of IVs to Google Search Interest in Bitcoin 
 
Despite these correlations, interest in Bitcoin as measured by Google search interest was 
not correlated (no >0.5 correlation at <0.05 significance) to any perceptions and usage measures, 
i.e., Bitcoin search interest was not correlated to perceptions and usage.  However, many of the 
perception and usage measures were positively or negatively correlated with each other, i.e., they 
were related somehow.  So, while Google search interest has some clear correlations to low 
socio-economic development metrics, search interest was not measured to be correlated to any 
other DVs.  Perhaps this is because search interest is mutually exclusive from perceptions and 
use, a research finding, or, perhaps, countries with lower socio-economic metrics have reason to 
seek more information about Bitcoin but were not included in the ING/Ipsos survey sample, and 
so these countries’ data were not available to analyze alongside other metrics, a methodological 
weakness.  Either way, it appears to be an area warranting more study, but this is a speculative 
assessment based on correlations only, and the limitation of the sample size available for detailed 
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perceptions and usage metrics must be underscored.  However, while considering this process 
model, it should be noted that the Bitcoin interest variable is correlated with a series of metrics 
that are suggestive of lower socio-economic status and anti-establishment tendencies.  Indeed, 
the reason the full sample of 28 countries was chosen was to include countries like Venezuela 
and Brazil, which both rank high in the areas of these positively correlated search interest results, 
thus helping to validate this research methodology. 
Conclusion 
Summary 
Digital currencies like Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have a complex but 
technologically solid foundation.  Their rapid growth over the past decade has challenged the 
view of currency as a “universal equivalent” and given new life to the argument that currency 
systems are social constructs.  Given their potential for adoption at a massive, global scale, and 
their ability to thwart state fiscal and monetary policy – including international sanctions – 
understanding how individuals from around the world perceive and use digital currency, and 
what social, economic, and policy factors influence those perceptions and levels of usage, is 
imperative.  This research begins to improve the quality of the debate about Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency, which has thus far seen a paucity of social science research, by seeking to 
explain the social, economic, and policy factors that underlie perceptions and usage of these new 
currency types. 
First, this research developed a novel theoretical matrix of trust and control to explain 
currency systems in general and the conditions under which people have chosen to use extant 
monetary systems.  Then, this research tested this theory with a quantitative analysis of policy, 
trust, socio-economic, and cultural factors affecting the perceptions and usage of a type of new 
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currency system – cryptocurrency – in samples of 15 countries (using the ING/Ipsos individual-
level data) and 28 countries (using country-level data).  The results support that matrix of trust 
and control as predicting where Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are situated in the landscape 
of all socio-economic values and especially relative to other currency systems. 
Because Bitcoin relies on zero trust (in the sense of social trust – one only has to “trust” 
the mathematics of cryptography), the theory predicts that countries with more individuals with 
more favorable perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies would express less generalized trust, 
a hypothesis that the empirical analysis supported.  But because Bitcoin relies on a highly 
controlled mathematical algorithm for its creation and transactions – as well as fixed supply – the 
technology applies an extreme form of control that can substitute for the absence of trust, just 
like the perceived value and durability of gold and other rare-earth specie currencies can 
compensate for such a dearth of trust.29  Further supporting this view, the analysis identifies a 
tendency for countries with high proportions of Bitcoin Evangelists to have lower democratic 
tendencies.  Democracy can be seen as a governance/control model that relies on greater mutual 
trust in society.  By contrast, those countries with lower perceptions and usage of Bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrencies had higher generalized trust scores and tended to be more democratic.  
The delta between the two personality types and their native country represents the challenge 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies have for mass adoption. 
This research also suggests that there are four mutually exclusive categories, or groups of 
individuals, in relation to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency attitudes and usage (personality types): 
Evangelist, Pragmatist, Skeptic, and Speculator.  Further, these categories may correspond to 
 
29 Similar to trusting the mathematics of cryptography, in specie currencies users must trust the assayers and experts 
in validating the legitimacy of the currency. 
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analogous – but mirror-image – personality types with regards to perceptions and usage of state 
currencies.  For example, those who are evangelists of the U.S. dollar or other top currencies are 
probably skeptics of Bitcoin.  The tendency for there to be more individuals in the ING/Ipsos-
surveyed countries to view similarly seven discrete uses of money and currency (from simple 
transactions to long-term savings) suggests our views of the multiple functions of money have, 
for many of us, coalesced around a single-purpose currency rather than different currencies for 
different functions.  This suggests that the universal equivalent theory is partially correct, the 
equivalency part; there are, however, multiple spheres of utility among a few personality types.  
These types may never overlap, despite the BIS Venn diagram in Figure 1 suggesting currencies 
usages largely do overlap.  This, too, is an area warranting further study based on these results. 
Because there are individuals whose personal choice for a single currency is a non-state 
currency like Bitcoin, policymakers should be wary about how future innovations in currency 
will be received.  The opportunity for non-state currencies to exist at least appears to have 
significant support in numerous countries despite what the policies may be or could be in the 
future.  Central bank digital currencies may cut into the appeal of Bitcoin for some individuals, 
or it may legitimize the technology allowing competitor non-national currencies to emerge and 
flourish. 
However, the research also suggests that policymakers may not be able to do much about 
the growth in popularity of cryptocurrencies, given its surprising finding that public policy is not 
correlated to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions and usage.  While there were significant 
questions as this research was being formulated and conducted about whether public policy is an 
independent or dependent variable, a finding of no correlation between public policy and Bitcoin 
perceptions and usage only leads to further questions.  Is public policy a control mechanism or 
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merely an indicator or barometer of public sentiment?  Perhaps it depends on the vagaries of 
culture and custom in each country.  At the very least, this research would suggest that public 
policy lags public sentiment (or takes time to have control effects, equally curious).  However, 
because perceptions and usage were higher in countries that were less democratic – where 
autocratic control is more likely and could be weakened by non-national currency – one might 
think there would be a negative correlation of policy to perceptions and usage.  By contrast, one 
might expect that countries that are more democratic, for instance, would have policies that are 
more in line with public sentiment, but this, too, was not the case: this research found no 
correlation between public policy and individuals’ perceptions and usage of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency. 
However, a possible explanation is that the rapidly changing landscape of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency is moving too fast for public policy to effectively keep up.  As discussed earlier, 
this may be similar to the phenomena of other recent peer-to-peer technologies like music 
sharing, Airbnb, or Uber and Lyft.  As those technological innovations (in some cases strictly 
corporations) were rapidly adopted around the world, business and government could not keep 
up with the disruptions to public services they caused.  For instance, regulatory and fiscal models 
were based on traditional taxi and livery services, but Uber and Lyft were new definitions of 
transportation that successfully lobbied to be unregulated, for a time, and reduced governmental 
tax collection and increased regulatory activities (governmental expenses).  However, policy 
slowly caught up the public’s growing consumption of these innovations so now tax 
collection/remittance and basic rules to protect the public apply directly to their services.  
However, policy has yet to be able to compensate for the longer-term effects of disintermediation 
of employment and occupational hazards that leave the part-time drivers of Uber and Lyft 
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without long-term stable jobs and benefits.  Similar unintended consequences could result from 
the long-term effects of denationalization of currency by Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, but 
where should the policy remedies take effect?  At the state or provincial level, nationally, or 
international policymaking levels? 
Finally, the finding that Bitcoin interest is not correlated with perceptions and usage – but 
is correlated with lower values on various socio-economic metrics – raises additional questions 
regarding who and what underpins interest in non-state currency systems.  Are users seeking 
information about a non-state currency system like Bitcoin because of a perception of weakness 
in the state system?  Or because of an interest in subverting the prevailing system?  Remittance 
volumes involving national currencies may have some relationship to Bitcoin interest search 
results, but this research did not find any statistically significant reportable results, only vague 
indications that the remittance rates were higher in similarly low socio-economic countries with 
more Bitcoin interest.  In any case, the fact that there is a strong correlation of interest from 
countries with lower socio-economic development, higher crime, and lower confidence in the 
armed forces, courts, and police warrants further study and analysis, and may be related to 
remittance volumes and immigration or emigration rates. 
In summary, these findings ground the noisy conjecture surrounding Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies and the speculative arguments that these monetary innovations may disrupt 
state currency systems and orthodox financial interests.  By quantifying where and why Bitcoin 
and cryptocurrency are more or less favorably regarded around the world, these findings show 
the extent to which trends in usage and perception of emergent digital currencies are associated 
with basic cultural and attitudinal tendencies that are not necessarily related to public policy or 
other typical monetary theory-based controls.  This research helps move scholars toward a 
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foundational understanding of digital currency as a socio-economic phenomenon – not just a 
novel, exotic financial trinket – and will help public policymakers better understand the options 
for and consequences of emergent non-state digital currencies.  As countries around the world 
contemplate conversion of their national systems to a centralized digital currency and because of 
this research’s analysis of user perceptions of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency, this research also 
sheds light on considerations for the adoption of state-backed (national) central bank digital 
currencies (CBDC).  CBDCs would have similar technology adoption curves to Bitcoin, if not 
also trust and control considerations, because digital currency transactions are not as anonymous 
of the users as traditional cash transactions and digital systems are more difficult for users to 
access. 
Other findings 
Three interesting findings were by-products of this research.  First, the United States had 
the highest favorable policy composite because of the number of political parties or politicians 
(as reported by Coin Dance according to the methodology above) with supportive policy 
positions regarding Bitcoin and cryptocurrency.  It was coded as having a score on this measure 
of 9; most countries had a score of 0 or 1, with Russia having the second-highest score of 4.  
However, the U.S. did not have the highest rank in any favorability metric for perceptions and 
usage except those related to speculation, only nodes.  If not for the favorable policy positions of 
parties or politicians, the U.S. would be in the middle of the policy favorability spectrum 
(approximately 12 with a range of 0-20 and an SD of approximately 4 for this index).  It is not 
clear why the U.S. should have so many more politicians and political parties with stated support 
for Bitcoin and cryptocurrency than all other countries; this may be indicative of other latent 
considerations for policymakers.  It may also be that the outsized measured level of political 
 127 
support in the U.S. is related to the far higher per capita and total overall number of Bitcoin 
nodes and ATMs in the United States versus other countries.  Node and ATM metrics were 
positively correlated to the composite public policy measure, GDP, and gold reserves, which 
suggests that there is a highly speculative component to the U.S. interest in Bitcoin – and that 
perhaps political parties and politicians feel the need to get on the bandwagon.  Perhaps, too, 
Bitcoin ATM network owners and node owners are large contributors to certain politicians and 
parties. 
It could, of course, be a weakness in the Coin Dance reporting system for political 
support (i.e., this research’s methodology for this measurement), though it is the kind of 
reporting that enthusiasts and the politicians constantly monitor and presumably submit for 
correction to Coin Dance, not just in the U.S. but anywhere.  So, while the U.S. was high (and 
presumed accurate) and the others were low, they are presumed accurate as well.  The politicians 
are, after all, wanting as many people to know of this support as possible.  For instance, while I 
could not have remembered the several U.S. political entities supporting Bitcoin, the listing on 
Coin Dance’s site for the U.S. was all too familiar upon review – Ron Paul, Libertarians, Andrew 
Yang, etc.  My sense is there is a reason why there is more political support (perhaps just “lip 
service” or vote pandering) in the U.S. than other countries but it is not apparent to me, yet.  
Further research is warranted as it could be related to overall trust and control factors. 
Finally, the WVS Wave 6 dataset was the first to probe deeper into trust than prior waves 
of WVS.  The primary trust question for prior waves had been whether respondents felt they 
could trust people or could not be too careful with other people, generalized trust only.  For 
Wave 6, which was the wave used in this research, the concepts of in-group trust and out-group 
were also measured, and this research integrated those metrics.  Throughout this analysis it 
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seemed like the nuances of in-group trust versus out-group trust could be an area of future study 
that may provide greater insight into Bitcoin and cryptocurrency perceptions and usage.  The 
length of time between Fukuyama and others positing nuances to generalized trust (in-group/out-
groups concepts of trust were developed in the 1990s) and when the first available survey results 
measured them (2014) is because of how long the WVS/EVS waves take to conduct.  This is 
significant and could begin to reveal all sorts of possibilities after Wave 7 is conducted and 
longitudinal reviews of these concepts can be done. 
Broader implications 
This research helps us situate the phenomena of cryptocurrencies in relation to other 
currencies and gives us an overall classification of currency systems.  It also suggests that we 
should avoid looking at the future of currency as a zero-sum game of displacement, with 
cryptocurrencies replacing fiat; such a simplistic view misunderstands the size of the global 
economy, the way currencies are intertwined and the pace of technology adoption.  To put it 
simply, many people have smartphones, but a digital wallet replacing a hip-pocket or purse 
wallet is going to take a long time to reach seven billion people.  In the meantime, the public and 
policymakers will need more data and information to understand these new currency possibilities 
and the consequences of possible public policy decisions in relation to them.  They will need 
substantive and practical models to help make sense of the past, present, and future of currency 
systems.  The trust and control matrix I have proposed can be useful in this regard. 
More broadly, this research expands our theoretical understanding of currencies, 
providing a perspective on what makes a given system viable.  This research considered not only 
economic but also social and political factors of the individuals expected to or clamoring to use 
these new cryptocurrencies.  The hope is that this research will also offer a contextual theory for 
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better understanding non-national – perhaps digital – currencies’ potential to supplement or 
supplant existing socio-economic values and exchanges, as well as the potential for disruption in 
currency systems that may be similar to those occurring in other areas due to peer-to-peer 
platforms (eBay, Airbnb, Uber). 
Many discourses on currency talk about currency uniformly as the universal equivalent 
and often the primary, hegemonic currencies like the U.S. dollar or Chinese yuan, or euro as if 
they were the same thing, just in different languages.  That may be the case with regard to those 
national currency systems, but a robust social theory of currency systems has to be able to 
encompass and differentiate all forms of economic exchange – whether they are fiat or 
cryptocurrencies, or less obvious or widespread types of value such as collectible baseball cards, 
rare art, complementary currencies, or hawala.  Such a theory should be able to speak to how 
past currency systems were doing the same thing as today’s system do, if with different media.  
That is to say, we have to figure out what does the thousand-pound stones on the island of Yap 
have in common with Bitcoin. 
Areas and methods of future study 
The main limitation of this research is the area most in need of future study: broadening 
the sample of countries with data on the dependent variables of cryptocurrency perception and 
usage.  The ING/Ipsos survey was by far the best available data in the ten years of Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency’s existence, but it is frustratingly limited in sample size for deeply statistical – 
even control/treatment style experimentation – results.  While the strength of the correlations and 
regressions was significant enough for reportable results in this research, there are likely nuances 
to other factors that were missed because of a small sample size.  ING/Ipsos did a second survey 
that was released in late 2019 with what appear to be similar results to the 2018 survey; 
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beginning to differentially compare the results of the two surveys will provide a sense of change 
over time, but the 2019 survey still has only 15 countries. 
There may be areas of the present research and future research that could look at socio-
economics and cultural metrics normalized or controlled for population or country size that yield 
important insights.  The present research created normalized metrics along these lines, but they 
were not significantly correlated with other metrics.  A larger sample size and other 
methodological improvements could lead to discernible findings in normalized-by-population 
metrics. 
In addition to a larger sample size, one important methodological approach to pursue in 
future research would be to integrate the IV and DV metrics into a single survey instrument (with 
a larger sample size per country and of more countries), so that hierarchal or multilevel modeled 
linear regressions could be done.  This, too, would likely result in strengthened support for the 
findings in this research but also reveal additional areas of significant ranges of trust and control 
for monetary choices, including for a new currency like Bitcoin.  The present research was cross-
sectional and an important first step, but a longitudinal series of surveys and research is a logical 
next step; specifically, combining the ING/Ipsos questions with WVS/EVS trust and cultural 
questions over multi-year iterations in 30+ countries with at least 1,000 responses per country 
would be an ideal goal for research of this type.  There are, I believe, several trade publications 
and industry-focused companies that could be partnered with rigorous social science researchers 
to plan and execute such research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
ING/Ipsos Survey Instrument Section on Cryptocurrencies: 
In this part of the survey, we will ask you some questions about your awareness and knowledge 
of cryptocurrencies. 
 
20 Have you ever heard of cryptocurrency? If so, do you own any?  
I have heard of cryptocurrency | I own some cryptocurrency | I expect to own 
cryptocurrency in the future 
With grid options for each item:  
Yes 
No <goto car sharing questions if ‘no’ for all 3 options> 
21 Crypto-money or cryptocurrency is a kind of digital currency. This currency is not created 
nor secured by the government, but by a network of individuals. Bitcoin is the best known 
example. 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
“Digital currencies – such as Bitcoins – are the future of spending online” 
“Digital currencies – such as Bitcoins – are the future of investment as storage of value” 
“I think the value of digital currencies – such as Bitcoins – will increase in the next 12 
months“ 
With grid options for each item:  
Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree or disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree, I don’t have 
an opinion  
22 Cryptocurrencies are a type of asset. How would you compare the risk of owning 
cryptocurrency compared to the following alternative assets? 
Cash, Government bonds, Stock market investment, Real estate/property funds, Gold,  
Investing in your own business 
With grid options for each item:  
Much higher risk compared to holding cryptocurrency 
Higher risk compared to holding cryptocurrency 
Lower risk compared to holding cryptocurrency 
Much lower risk compared to holding cryptocurrency 
About the same risk as holding cryptocurrency 
23 If you had money available (about 1 month’s take-home/net pay) and you wanted some 
more information on cryptocurrency as a possible investment, where would you most 
likely get advice?  
PROG: Randomise categories (except last category) <select only 1> 
An independent financial advisor or bank advisor 
My friends/My family  
The internet and specialist websites 
An online computer program or algorithm that provides tailored advice 
I (would) never invest money in cryptocurrency 
I don’t know 
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24 Would you use cryptocurrencies – such as Bitcoin - for the following activities if you had 
the option?  
Buy cup of coffee 
Receive your take-home pay  
Pay taxes 
Pay your monthly electricity bill  
Buy a plane fare  
Make an international payment for a product you buy online  
Save for your child’s university fees   
With grid options for each item:  
PROG: MP 
Yes EXCLUSIVE 
No, I don’t want to change the way I pay  
No, I think there would be too much risk  
No, Bitcoin is interesting to me only as an investment  
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Appendix B 
World Values Survey questions used for this research from Wave 6, 2014: 
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Appendix C 
European Values Study items used for this research from 2017 questions: 
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Appendix D 
Margins of error at 95% confidence level (Tausch, 2019): 
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Appendix E 
Ipsos-only countries’ response frequency and descriptives statistics: 
I have: Heard of Crypto Own Crypto Expect to Own 
Country   Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Austria 
No 209 20.7 925 91.7 817 81.0 
Yes 800 79.3 84 8.3 192 19.0 
Total 1009 100.0 1009 100.0 1009 100.0 
Belgium 
No 625 62.0 963 95.5 907 90.0 
Yes 383 38.0 45 4.5 101 10.0 
Total 1008 100.0 1008 100.0 1008 100.0 
France 
No 531 50.1 999 94.2 882 83.2 
Yes 529 49.9 61 5.8 178 16.8 
Total 1060 100.0 1060 100.0 1060 100.0 
Germany 
No 298 29.7 928 92.3 796 79.2 
Yes 707 70.3 77 7.7 209 20.8 
Total 1005 100.0 1005 100.0 1005 100.0 
Italy 
No 304 29.9 939 92.2 778 76.4 
Yes 714 70.1 79 7.8 240 23.6 
Total 1018 100.0 1018 100.0 1018 100.0 
Luxembourg 
No 181 32.7 531 96.0 487 88.1 
Yes 372 67.3 22 4.0 66 11.9 
Total 553 100.0 553 100.0 553 100.0 
Netherlands 
No 468 45.5 954 92.7 890 86.5 
Yes 561 54.5 75 7.3 139 13.5 
Total 1029 100.0 1029 100.0 1029 100.0 
Poland 
No 233 22.8 906 88.6 722 70.6 
Yes 790 77.2 117 11.4 301 29.4 
Total 1023 100.0 1023 100.0 1023 100.0 
Romania 
No 255 25.3 881 87.5 621 61.7 
Yes 752 74.7 126 12.5 386 38.3 
Total 1007 100.0 1007 100.0 1007 100.0 
Spain 
No 338 33.2 917 90.0 693 68.0 
Yes 681 66.8 102 10.0 326 32.0 
Total 1019 100.0 1019 100.0 1019 100.0 
Turkey 
No 299 29.3 836 81.9 557 54.6 
Yes 722 70.7 185 18.1 464 45.4 
Total 1021 100.0 1021 100.0 1021 100.0 
United Kingdom 
No 400 39.4 955 94.0 871 85.7 
Yes 616 60.6 61 6.0 145 14.3 
Total 1016 100.0 1016 100.0 1016 100.0 
Czech Republic 
No 317 30.7 939 91.1 839 81.4 
Yes 714 69.3 92 8.9 192 18.6 
Total 1031 100.0 1031 100.0 1031 100.0 
USA 
No 438 43.5 930 92.3 803 79.7 
Yes 570 56.5 78 7.7 205 20.3 
Total 1008 100.0 1008 100.0 1008 100.0 
Australia 
No 306 30.0 957 93.7 873 85.5 
Yes 715 70.0 64 6.3 148 14.5 
Total 1021 100.0 1021 100.0 1021 100.0 
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Usage Type Index Mean by Country 
  Evangelist Pragmatist Skeptic Prospector 
Austria 
Valid N 807.0 807.0 807.0 807.0 
Missing N 202.0 202.0 202.0 202.0 
Mean 0.9 3.8 1.5 1.1 
Belgium 
Valid N 395.0 395.0 395.0 395.0 
Missing N 613.0 613.0 613.0 613.0 
Mean 0.8 3.7 1.6 1.1 
France 
Valid N 561.0 561.0 561.0 561.0 
Missing N 499.0 499.0 499.0 499.0 
Mean 1.1 3.4 1.4 1.3 
Germany 
Valid N 721.0 721.0 721.0 721.0 
Missing N 284.0 284.0 284.0 284.0 
Mean 1.0 3.6 1.5 1.1 
Italy 
Valid N 727.0 727.0 727.0 727.0 
Missing N 291.0 291.0 291.0 291.0 
Mean 2.0 2.9 1.2 1.0 
Luxembourg 
Valid N 383.0 383.0 383.0 383.0 
Missing N 170.0 170.0 170.0 170.0 
Mean 0.7 4.1 1.4 1.1 
Netherlands 
Valid N 581.0 581.0 581.0 581.0 
Missing N 448.0 448.0 448.0 448.0 
Mean 0.7 3.9 1.7 0.9 
Poland 
Valid N 812.0 812.0 812.0 812.0 
Missing N 211.0 211.0 211.0 211.0 
Mean 1.5 3.0 1.6 1.1 
Romania 
Valid N 776.0 776.0 776.0 776.0 
Missing N 231.0 231.0 231.0 231.0 
Mean 2.2 2.6 1.1 1.2 
Spain 
Valid N 738.0 738.0 738.0 738.0 
Missing N 281.0 281.0 281.0 281.0 
Mean 1.8 2.9 1.4 1.1 
Turkey 
Valid N 768.0 768.0 768.0 768.0 
Missing N 253.0 253.0 253.0 253.0 
Mean 2.6 2.7 0.7 1.1 
United Kingdom 
Valid N 627.0 627.0 627.0 627.0 
Missing N 389.0 389.0 389.0 389.0 
Mean 0.9 3.6 1.8 1.0 
Czech Republic 
Valid N 720.0 720.0 720.0 720.0 
Missing N 311.0 311.0 311.0 311.0 
Mean 1.2 3.4 1.1 1.4 
USA 
Valid N 606.0 606.0 606.0 606.0 
Missing N 402.0 402.0 402.0 402.0 
Mean 1.4 3.1 1.8 1.1 
Australia 
Valid N 727.0 727.0 727.0 727.0 
Missing N 294.0 294.0 294.0 294.0 
Mean 0.8 3.7 2.0 0.9 
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Google Trends, ATMs, Bitcoin Nodes in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
Country Google Trend ATMs Nodes Population(M) ATMs/Cap(M) Nodes/Cap(M) 
USA  6 3702 2363 327.096 11.3178 7.2242 
Australia  7 25 132 24.898 1.0041 5.3016 
Netherlands  8 42 496 17.06 2.4619 29.0739 
United K. 8 273 301 67.142 4.0660 4.4830 
Belgium  8 14 40 11.482 1.2193 3.4837 
Czech Rep. 8 69 82 10.666 6.4692 7.6880 
Luxembourg  9 0 10 0.604 0.0000 16.5563 
Romania  9 38 41 19.506 1.9481 2.1019 
Poland  10 48 50 37.922 1.2658 1.3185 
Turkey  11 25 13 82.34 0.3036 0.1579 
France  11 2 606 64.991 0.0308 9.3244 
Austria  12 251 52 8.891 28.2308 5.8486 
Italy  13 54 70 60.627 0.8907 1.1546 
Germany  14 36 1891 83.124 0.4331 22.7491 
Spain  19 94 59 46.693 2.0131 1.2636 
 
State/public Policy Dimensions and Composite in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
Country Comp. Legality Classific. Exchange ICO Political Payments Fiat Cv Legislation Warning 
Romania  8 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Belgium  9 2 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 
Italy  10 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 
Czech Rep. 10 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 
Australia  11 2 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 
United K. 11 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 
France  11 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Poland  12 1 3 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 
Spain  14 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Austria  14 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Turkey  14 3 2 3 3 0 0 1 1 1 
Netherlands  16 3 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg  16 2 4 3 3 0 1 1 1 1 
Germany  16 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 
USA  21.5 2 2.5 2 2 9 1 1 1 1 
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Basic Demographic Factors in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
Country GDP(B) Gini HDI Happy 
Net 
Mig.(K) 
Net Mg 
(1/K Pop) 
Population 
(M) 
Population 
Dens.(Pop./sq KM) 
Luxembourg  69.49 33.8 0.904 7.0903 49 16.3 0.604 250 
Romania  239.55 35.9 0.811 6.0697 -370 -3.8 19.506 85 
Czech Republic  245.23 25.9 0.888 6.8521 110 2.1 10.666 138 
Austria  455.74 30.5 0.908 7.246 325 7.4 8.891 107 
Belgium  531.77 27.7 0.916 6.923 240 4.2 11.482 377 
Poland  585.78 31.8 0.865 6.1817 -147 -0.8 37.922 124 
Turkey  766.51 41.9 0.791 5.3726 1420 3.5 82.340 107 
Netherlands  913.66 28.2 0.931 7.4876 80 0.9 17.060 511 
Spain  1426.19 36.2 0.891 6.3541 200 0.9 46.693 94 
Australia  1432.20 35.8 0.939 7.228 791 6.4 24.898 3 
Italy  2073.90 35.4 0.88 6.2234 745 2.5 60.627 205 
France  2777.54 32.7 0.901 6.5921 183 0.6 64.991 122 
United K.  2825.21 33.2 0.922 7.0537 1303 3.9 67.142 275 
Germany  3996.76 31.7 0.936 6.985 2719 6.6 83.124 237 
USA  20494.10 41.5 0.924 6.8923 4774 2.9 327.096 36 
 
Foreign Exchange-Monetary/Gold Factors in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
Country ForExUSD ForExCNY ForExEUR Gold Rsvs(T) 
Rsvs FX ex-
Gold(M) 
Rsvs FX w-
Gold(M) 
Resvs Gold 
% 
Australia  1.322 0.206 1.544 80.000 53259.014 56475.271 0.057 
Netherlands  0.856 0.133 1.000 612.454 12215.851 36838.462 0.668 
Italy  0.856 0.133 1.000 2451.837 49980.286 148552.009 0.664 
United K. 0.749 0.117 0.874 310.287 142966.009 155440.551 0.080 
USA  1.000 0.156 1.168 8133.462 114057.675 441049.007 0.741 
Luxembourg  0.856 0.133 1.000 2.239 824.896 914.928 0.098 
Germany  0.856 0.133 1.000 3369.880 59192.352 194672.357 0.696 
Spain  0.856 0.133 1.000 281.578 57712.845 69033.168 0.164 
Austria  0.856 0.133 1.000 279.991 12681.825 23938.376 0.470 
Turkey  4.601 0.717 5.373 281.578 57712.845 69033.168 0.164 
Poland  0.856 0.133 1.000 102.967 104814.664 108954.260 0.038 
Belgium  0.856 0.133 1.000 227.396 17125.484 26267.524 0.348 
Romania  0.856 0.133 1.000 103.698 36985.450 41154.451 0.101 
France  0.856 0.133 1.000 2436.036 65715.578 163652.073 0.598 
Czech Rep. 0.856 0.133 1.000 9.278 143809.982 144182.988 0.003 
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Trust Factors of Society and Government in ING/Ipsos Sample Countries 
Country 
People 
Can Be 
Trusted 
Trust 
Family 
Trust 
Neighbor 
People 
Known 
Person 
People 
Met for 
1st Time 
People 
Another 
Relig 
People 
Another 
Nation 
Imp. 
Live In 
Dem. 
Dem. is 
Country 
Today 
EIU 
Dem. 
Index 
Romania 7.70 3.77 2.38 2.57 1.62 1.97 1.96 8.57 5.04 6.38 
Turkey 11.60 3.93 3.22 3.08 1.94 2.16 2.17 8.57 6.41 4.37 
Spain 19.90 3.92 3.05 3.26 2.23 2.45 2.45 8.64 6.64 8.08 
Cz. Rep. 21.70 3.83 2.99 3.22 2.30 2.42 2.32 8.16 5.80 7.69 
Poland 22.20 3.67 2.81 2.96 2.07 2.54 2.55 8.70 5.89 6.67 
France 27.70 3.64 2.91 3.30 2.18 2.73 2.78 8.74 6.47 7.80 
Italy 27.90 3.84 2.87 2.81 2.09 2.51 2.53 9.20 6.04 7.71 
USA 34.80 3.65 2.76 3.21 2.20 2.71 2.66 8.41 6.46 7.96 
UK 41.20 3.85 3.05 3.53 2.49 2.93 2.94 8.83 6.62 8.53 
Germany 44.60 3.71 2.83 3.06 2.15 2.52 2.51 8.94 7.23 8.68 
Austria 47.00 3.83 3.11 3.31 2.31 2.52 2.58 9.11 7.42 8.29 
Australia 51.40 3.81 2.79 3.36 2.33 2.64 2.70 8.83 6.79 9.09 
Netherlnd 66.10 3.53 2.84 3.08 2.11 2.39 2.35 8.87 7.29 8.89 
Luxemb. - - - - - - - - - 8.81 
Belgium  - - - - - - - - - 7.78 
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